DEAN v. NELSON.

while other customers paid only 81. 8s. Lord ELDON sent the
case to a jury to determine "whether this was an agreement for
a division of the profits, or B. stood only in the relation of a
vendor of beer to this retailer at 41. 5s. per barrel, in consideration of paying half his rent, selling to others at 31. 88." Now,
if we seek to apply the rule of Cox v. Rickman to this case, we
find it just as difficult to say whether A. and B. were mutually
principal and agent, as it is to decide as an original question,
whether they were partners or not. We shall not undertake to
solve the problem, but will leave it to suggest its own solution, in
the belief that this article has already exceeded its proper limits.
The reasoning contained in the foregoing observations may not
always be capable of easy and useful applicatibn, still there may
be many cases in which it will facilitate the solution of the main
question and lead to satisfactorily conclusions. And especially
is this likely to be true in eases of annuities and loans, or in
cases like that of Cox v. Hickman, where it may be important to
show that the liability is completely exhausted in some intermediate party and consequently cannot reach beyond. For as
we have seen, the person to be charged mugt be a party to a contract either express or implied, and where it is not expressed and
cannot be inferred from the actual relations of the parties, there
can of course be no contract and by consequence no liability.
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breaking out of the late rebellion, was the owner of a large
amount of capital stock in the Memphis Gas-light Company, a
corporation of Tennessee, located and doing business at Memphis,
in that state. In May 1861 he transferred his entire stock to
James H. Pepper, secretary of the company, to enable him (Pepper) to make some disposition of it in view of approaching hostilities. On the 11th day of June 1861, Pepper sold and transferred fifty shares of $100 each to Thomas A. Nelson, then of Memphis, at par, receiving for the consideration Nelson's note, under
seal, dated June 11th 1861, whereby he promised to pay to the
order of Pepper $5000, with interest at 6 per cent. per annum,
out of the net receipts of earnings on the sum of $5000 of the
capital stock of the company, payable in quarteily instalments,
the interest being first paid and balance of said net receipts then
to be applied upon the principal, which instalments should amount
to such sum of money as should be equal to the quarterly net receipts of earnings on $5000 of the capital stock of the company;
it was further expressed in the note that it was given for the purchase-money of $5000 of the capital stock of the company, sold
and transferred to Nelson by Pepper; and that if Nelson failed
to pay any of the instalments quarterly, as aforesaid, after the
receipt by the company of said net earnings, then the full
sum of $5000, with interest, less interest and instalments paid,
should become due and payable.
To secure the payment of this note Nelson, on the same day,
executed to Pepper a paper, in the ordinary form of a mortgage,
conveying to Pepper, his heirs and assigns, the following real
and personal property, viz.: so much of Nelson's individual
interest, right, title, and estate in the property and premises of
and belonging to the Memphis Gas-light Company as should be
represented by and equal to the $5000 of capital stock of said
company at par, then describing the real and personal property
which the company owned, being gas-works and other property
in Memphis, and concluding with the usual condition, to be void
on the payment of the note according to the tenor and effect
thereof. This mortgage was duly acknowledged and recorded
in the registry of mortgages for Shelby county. On the 20th
day of July 1861, Pepper sold and transferred to Nelson 6ne
hundred and fifty-four additional shares of said company, at the
par value of $15,400, and received a similar note and mortgage
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for the consideration thereof. It appears from the evidence in
the case that Pepper sold this stock to Nelson and the remainder
of Dean's stock to other persons, when he did, under apprehension that it would be confiscated by the Confederate authorities,
as was threatened to be done, and from a desire to leave Memphis
for his own personal safety. But Nelson swears that he made
the purchase of the stock in good faith, and he received it without
any trust or pledge for its return.
The war soon began to rage with severity, and all intercourse
between the states in rebellion (including Tennessee) and the
other states of the Union, was not only interrupted, but was prohibited by President Lincoln's proclamation of August 16th
1861, made in pursuance of the Act of Congress of the 13th of
July previous.
Nelson continued to reside at Memphis, within the Confederate
lines, and received the regular quarterly dividends on the two
hundred and four shares of stock, but did not and could not
make any payment to Pepper or to Dean, to whom Pepper
assigned the notes and mortgages, they both being within the
Union lines. The amount of dividends thus received by Nelson
was $3672.
On the 1st of June 1862, Nelson transferred one hundred and
ninety-four shares of the stock to his wife, having previously
transferred ten shares to May. Both transfers were without consideration, except that the object of the transfer to May was to
make him a director, and the professed object of the transfer to
Nelson's wife was to make a separate provision for her maintenance.
On the 6th of June 1862, the Federal forces entered the city
of Memphis, and held military possession of that part of Tennessee until the close of the war. Dean visited Memphis during
the summer and fall of 1862, and saw Nelson there, who failed
to make any payment on the notes. Nelson swears that Dean
refused to receive any payment, alleging that the stock was absolutely forfeited by the failure to pay. Dean swears that he asked
Nelson what ie proposed to do about the payment of the net
earnings which he had received, and that Nelson answered that lie
was not disposed to pay it, because he might have to pay it again
to the Confederate Government. From the evidence in the case
(the testimony of Fitch) we are inclined to believe that this
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ground was assumed by Nelson, and that he did not make an
unequivocal tender of the money due, and whilst it is probably
true that Dean insisted that the stock was forfeited, we are not
satisfied that his conduct was such as to obviate the necessity of
a tender by Nelson if the latter wished to prevent the principal
from becoming due. At this time Nelson was allowed to remain
peaceably within the Union lines, and there was no reason why
he should not have paid the money to Dean.
On the 5th of April 1863, Nelson, with his family, was ordered
to remove south of the lines of the United States forces, and not
to return. This order was made in retaliation for some outrages
committed by guerillas in the vicinity. In pursuance of it Nelson and his family removed within the Oonfederate lines, and remained therein during the remainder of the war; and were not
permitted to re-enter Memphis, although Nelson, at one time,
requested permission to do so. The other complainant, May, was
within the Confederate lines during the entire contest.
On the 25th of April 1863 General Yeatch, then commanding
the military district of Memphis, by a special order, established
and organized a court or civil commission for the hearing and
determination of all complaints and suits instituted by loyal citizens for the collection of debts, enforcement of contracts, prevention of frauds, recovery of the possession of property, and
generally to do whatever can be done by a court deriving its
powers from military authority. Before this court or civil commission, on the 1st day of September 1863, Dean filed a petition
for the foreclosure and sale of the two hundred and four shares
of stock, in order to raise the amount due on the notes. The
present appellees, Nelson and wife and May, were made defendants, but were returned not found; and publication of notice to
them to appear was made in accordance with the laws of Tennessee existing prior to the rebellion. No appearance being
effected, a decree was made, execution issued, and the stock was
sold by the marshal on the 23d day of October 1863, to one
Hanlin, and was subsequently transferred to him on the books of
the company by the secretary, pursuant to an order of the civil
commission. Hanlin immediately transferred the stock to Dean.
From that period to the institution of this suit Dean drew the
dividends on the stock.
The appellees filed the bill in this case in June 1865, praying,
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in substance, that the stock might be decreed to belong to them,
and that Dean might account for all the dividends received by
him, to be applied to the payment of the notes, &c., and for
general relief.
The app.ellant, in his answer, sets up and insists upon two
grounds of defence: First, the forfeiture of the condition of the
mortgage, which, under the circumstances of the case, and from
the unconscionable nature of the transaction, he insists should
be held to be an absolute forfeiture,°without benefit of redemption; in other words, that the instrument should be regarded as
a conditional assignment or transfer, and not as a mortgage.
Secondly, the defendant sets up the proceedings before the civil
commission, by which, as he contends, even if the instrument
were a mortgage, all equity of redemption in the stock was foreclosed. The appellees, on the contrary, insist that the paper was
a mere mortgage; that the condition in the notes making the
principal due if the instalments were not regularly paid was in
the nature of a penalty, and should not have been enforced in an
equitable proceeding; that the court or civil commission was
illegal and without authority; that it never had any jurisdiction
of the person of the appellants, nor of the property attempted
to be foreclosed; that the existence of the war, and the residence
of the appellees within the Confederate lines, forbade any legal
proceedings against them or their property; that, therefore, they
have been illegally dispossessed of the latter, and are entitled to
have it restored to them without conditions; and, finally, that
the appellant is accountable to them for the dividends received
by him, to be credited on the notes.
In determining the questions raised by this record, in the first
place, Dean must be regarded as concluded on the question of
the sale of his stock. Had the transaction been merely an agreement for a sale upon the ttrms on which the sale was actually
made, and this a bill by ther vendees for a specific performance,
we should find great difficulty in distinguishing this case from
that of -Dorsey v. Packwood, 12 Howard 126. But here the sale
was actually made, and the stock was actually transferred to
Nelson, so that, in the absence of fraud, it became absolutely his.
And in support of the bona fides of the transaction, it may be.
said, that in view of all the contingencies of the situation, the
arrangement was at the time an advantageous one for Dean. At
VoL. XIX.-15
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all events, he chose, on the whole, to acquiesce in it, and in his
bill to foreclose the stock, presented before the civil commission,
he makes no claim but that of holder of the mortgage, affirming
and claiming under. Nelson's title throughout. And in his answer to the present bill he nowhere hints that Nelson was guilty
of any bad faith in the transaction, or made any agreement to
hold the stock for him, or in any other way than as a bond fide
purchaser'thereof. And it is hardly correct to say that Nelson
incurred no obligation in the transaction. He agreed to pay the
whole amount immediately in case of failure to pay any instalment after the receipt by the company of the net quarterly earnings. And this condition was not in the nature of a penalty, as
surmised by the appellees; but was of the substance of the contract. So that, on failure to pay or tender the money received
by him, or by the company, on account of the stock purchased,
the whole debt became due and payable as a personal obligation
of Nelson.
But, at all events, the stock was actually sold and transferred,
and became the property of Nelson, and was possessed by him.
The contract was an executed contract, ond that transaction cannot now be impeached.
The next question relates to the character of the instrument
given by Nelson to Pepper as security for the payment of his
notes. Was it a conditional sale, or was it a mortgage? On
this question hardly a doubt can be raised. The court is asked
by the appellant, under the circumstances of the case, which the
appellant asserts to have been unconscionable on Nelson's part,
to consider the instrument as a conditional conveyance of the
stock, and not a mortgage. But the court has no power over the
transaction to make it other than, or different from, what the
parties themselves made it. If it is a mortgage, it is the duty of
the court to declare it a mortgage; and if it is a mortgage it has,
perforce, all the incidents and privileges of a mortgage ; and
that it is a mortgage there is no room for question. The principal engagement is contained in the note, which creates a debt as
soon as earnings or dividends are received. The other instrument is secondary, and is intended as security for the payment
of the note. The appellee himself, in his proceedings before the
civil commission, treats his claim as a debt, and the instrument of
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security as a mortgage. He calls it a mortgage; and the doctrine of "once a mortgage always a mortgage," applies to it.
Then, being a mortgage, whether of real or personal property,
the mortgagor has an equity of redemption, unless it has been
extinguished in some legal way. The great question of the cause
is, whether the equity of redemption has been extinguished.
It is unnecessary to decide whether the mortgage was one of
real or of personal estate, or whether it was a legal or only an
equitable mortgage. As no attempt has been made to cut off the
equity of redemption, in any other manner than by legal proceedings, the question is reduced to the simple one, whether those
legal proceedings are valid and effectual for the purpose.
It is objected that the court or civil commission was not legally
established; but it is not necessary to determine that question, as
the proceedings themselves were fatally defective. The defendantA in the proceedings (the appellees here) were within the Confederate lines at the time, and it was unlawful for them to cross
those lines. Two of them had been expelled .the Union lines by
military authority, and were not permitted to return. The other,
Benjamin May, had never left the Confederate lines. A notice
directed to them and published in a newspaper was a mere idle
form. They could not lawfully see nor obey it. As to them, the
proceedings were wholly void and inoperative.
This leaves the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property unextinguished ; and it is, therefore, the right of the appellees to redeem it.
In the opinion of the court, the whole principal and interest of
the notes have become due and payable, and a redemption and
retransfer of the stock should be decreed only on condition of the
payment of principal and interest in full, after giving to the appellees credit for the sums received by the appellant; legal interest on each side to be allowed.
The decree of the Circuit Court, therefore, will be so far modified that, instead of requiring the appellant to forthwith transfer
the stock, as directed in the decree, he be decreed to transfer it
to the defendants, Miriam W. Nelson and Benjamin May, respectively, as therein directed, upon payment by the appellees to
the appellant of the amount which shall be found to be due to
him on the said two notes, after taking and stating the account
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in the said decree afterwards directed; neither party to recover
costs of the other in this appeal.
It is one of the effects of a state of
war to make unlawful all pacific unlicensed intercourse with the enemy. This
general principle of the law of nations
was well stated by JouNsox, J., in rendering the opinion of the court in the
case of The Rapid, 8 Cranch 155. He
said: "In the state of war, nation is
known to nation only by their armed exterior; each threatening the other with
conquest or annihilation. The individuals who compose the belligerent states
exist, as to each other, in a state of utter
occlusion. If they meet, it is only in
combat." "On 'this point," he adds,
"there is really no difference of opinion
among jurists :" see also Amory v. Ganage, 15 Johns. 24; Griswold v. Waddibyton, 16 Johns. 438 ; Seaman v. Waddington, Id. 510; The Venice, 2 Wal.
258; Vattel, Droit des Gens, B. 3, Ch.
5, see. 70; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac
Pac., Lib. 6, Ch. 3, sec. 9; and Ch. 4,
sec. 8 ; Burlamaqul, Prin. du Droit Nat.
et Pol., Pt. 4, Ch. 4, see. 20. It follows, that any conduct, communication,or intercourse inconsistent with a state of
war is unlawful. See all the authorities
cited in this note, particularly Griswold
v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 452, -457,
474, 478, 479, 481-485, where the cases
are collected by Chancellor KENT, and
the rule announced, that no unlicensed
intercourse whatever with an enemy is
lawful. But see, contra, Mixer v. Sibley,
1 Chicago Leg. News 297, in effect overruling the case of The Rapid, 8 Cranch
155. See also Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100
Mass. 561. The chief difficulty is to apply this general rule to particular cases.
It will aid us to that end, to consider the
reasons upon which it stands. Two reasons may be given: Any communication
or intercourse, not hostile, between belligerents, however innocent or apparently
harmless, would furnish opportunities for

treasonable practices ; and, if commercial
in its nature, or involving the making or
executing of contracts, it would tend to
increase the pecuniary resources, or relieve the financial embarrassments, of
the enemy. Accordingly, all trading,
negotiating, or contracting, and all performing of contracts existing before the
war, with one now an enemy, are forbidden. Contracts made before the war,
hut remaining unexecuted at the time of
its outbreak, are suspended so long as
the war lasts ; those inade, flagrantebello,
are absolutely void: Crawford v. The
Wn. Penn, 3 Wash. C. C. 484; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438; .Ex
parte Boussma/ker, 13 Vesey 71 ; Wheat.
Int. Law, sees. 305-317 ; Leathers v. Ins.
Co., 2 Bush 296 ; Willison v. Patterson,
7 Taunt. 43; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wal.
532; Tucker v. Watson, 6 Am. Law
Reg. (-N. S.) 220; Dorsey v. Kyle, 30
Md. 512. If the operation of the general rule be deemed disadvantageous, the
political power can relieve from it by
granting licenses to violate it: Coppell
v. Hall, 7 Wal. 542 ; McKee v. United
States, 8 Id. 163. Thus, it is clearly
unlawful to buy from or sell to an enemy
goods or merchandise, whether contraband of war or not: The Ouachita
Cotton, 6 Wal. 521. The state of war
operates upon the relations of debtor and
creditor, suspending them while the war
continues: The United States v. Grossmayer, 9 Wal. 72. So, the drawing,
negotiating, or remitting of hills of exchange, upon or for the account of an
enemy, is unlawful: Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438; Willison v.
Patterson, 7 Taunt. 439 ; 4 Moore 133,
a. c. ; Hoare v. Allen, 2 Dal. 102 ;
Conn v. Penn, 1 Pet. C. C. 523; Denniston v. Imbrie, 3 Wash. C. C. 396 ;
Billgery v. Branch, 8 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 334. A single exception is
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where bills are drawn by prisoners of
war for subsistence or for their ransom;
Antoine v. Moorhead, 6 Taunt. 237;
Vattel, Droit des Gens, B. 3, Ch. 16, see.
264; Cornu v. l3lackburne, Doug. 641 ;
Yates v. Hall, 1 T. R. 73; Goodrich
v. Gordon, 15 Johns. 6; Griswold v.
Waddington, 16 Johns. 451 ; Kershaw
v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561. But, contra,
see Havelock v. Roc-wood, 8 T. R. 269;
Potts v. Bell, Id. 548. It is also unlawful for one having goods in an
enemy's country, at tlfe outbreak of war,
to withdraw them to the country of the
owner; certainly, unless it be done
promptly. If left an unreasonable time,
they become impressed with the character of enemy's goods, and are lawful
prize: The Rapid, 8 Cranch 155; The
Win. Bagaley, 5 Wal. 377; The Hampton, Id. 372. So, the contract ofpartnership is dissolved, or, at least, suspended,
by the state of war: Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns. 57 ; s. c., on appeal,
16 Johns. 438; The Min. Bagaley, 5
Wal. 377. It is unlawful to complete
contracts with an enemy after war breaks
out. To this rule the following case
was held to be an exception. Where A.
contracted with B. to deliver to him lumber, and war supervened between their
respective countries, before the contract
was fully executed, held, that B. might
pay a balance due for lumber delivered,
in pursuance of the contract, in B.'s
own country, to A.'s agent residing
there, although such delivery took place
after the war broke out: Buchanan v.
Curry, 19 Johns. 137. It could not
benefit the enemT that A. delivered the
lumber here; and, though it might benefit him if the price paid were to be
transmitted to him by his agent, still it
must be presumed it would not be so
transmitted, but that the agent would
retain it here while the war lasted.
On the same principle it has been held,
that it is not unlawful to pay a debt to an
enemy, flagrante ello, provided it be

paid to him personally in the debtor's
country, or to an agent authorized to receive it residing there, but appointed before the war. *See Conn v. Penn, 1 Pet.
C. C. 524-5 ; The United States v. Grossinayer, 9 Wal. 72.
It is unlawful to correspond with an
enemy by letter: Griswold v. Wadding-ton, 16 Johns. 473, referring to the action of the Continental Congress in
June 1778, and citing from its Journal,
vol. 4, p. 254; so, doubtless, would it
be to use for any private unlicensed
purpose the telegraph, carrier pigeons,
balloons, signals, or communications in
newspapers, directed to, or intended to
reach, an enemy.
From the same principles, it follows,
that interest ceases to accrue upon contracts during the continuance of a war
between the countries of the parties to
them: Hoare v. Allen, 2 Dal. 102;
Foxcraft v. Nagle, Id. 132; McCall v.
Turner, 1 Call 133; Brewer v. Hastie,
3 Call 22; Paul v. Christie, 4 H. &
31cH. 161 ; Conn v. Penn, 1 Pet. C. C.
523; Denniston v. 1nbrie, 3 Wash. C.
C. 396; Ward v. Smith, 7 Wal. 447;
Bigler v. Waller, 3 Chicago Leg. News
26; Teaton v. Berney, Id. 82; Tucker
v. Watson, 6 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
220. So, statutes of limitation are suspended as to such contracts : Wall v.
Robson, 2 N. & MIcC. 498; Moses v.
Jones, Id. 259 ; Nicks] v. Martindale,
Harper (S. C.) 138; Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch 272; Hopkirk v. Bell,
3 Cranch 54; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wal.
532 ; Jackson Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 6 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 732; Conn. Ins. Co.
v. Hall, 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 606;
Semmes v. Ins. Co., 8 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 673. To the rule respecting
interest there are some exceptions:Where the hostile creditor resides in the
debtor's country, or has an agent there
authorized to receive the debt ; and
where the debt was made payable at a
particular place in the debtor's country,
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and the debtor has failed to pay, or to
offer to pay, there, at maturity, interest
will be allowed, although a state of war
has intervened. See the cases cited
above as to interest. It is presumed the
rule would be, to some extent, the same
in regard to statutes of limitation. They
would, doubtless, not be suspended, were
the enemy debtor or creditor residing
here under a license, and so,-capable of
suing or being sued upon the contract.
See the cases cited below. Also Braun
T. Saurwein, 10 or 11 Wal. It has long
been settled that an alien enemy, resident in his own country, can neither sue
nor be sued in the tribunals 6f the country with which his own is at war: Crawford v. The Win. Penn, 3 Wash. C. C.
106; Wilcox v. Henry, 1 Dal. 69;
Mumford v. Muinford, 1 Gal. 366 ; Bell
v. Chapman, 10 Johns, 183; Johnson v.
Decker, 11 Johns, 418 ; Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gal. 105; The Emulous, 1 Gal.
563; Brandon v. Nesbit, 6 T. R. 23 ;
Bristow v. -Lowers, Id. 35 ; Potts v. Bell,
8 T. R. 548 ; Senunes v. Ins. Co., 8 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 673; The Hoop, I C.
Rob. Adm. 200; Hanger v. Abbott, 6
WVal. 532. But see, contra, Dorsey v.
Kyle, 30 Md. 512; Dorsey v. Dorsey,
Id. 522 ; Mixer v. Sibley, 1 Chicago
Leg. News 297. And where a suit had
been commenced, and was, at the outbreak of the late war, pending between
persons who became enemies thereby,
the jurisdiction of the court ceased when
the war broke out; and it could enter no
order by which the rights of the nonresident defendant could be affected :
Livingston v. Jordan, Am. Law Reg. for
Jan. 1871, 53, per CirsE, C. J., Supreme Court U. S. But, if the alien
enemy reside here at the outbreak of the
war, or come hither to reside, flagrante
bello, under an express or implied license from the government, he may sue
or be sued here as in peace: Clarke v.
Mlorey, 10 Johns. 69. Compare Buckley v. Lytle, 10 Johns. 117 ; Owens v.

Hannay, 9 Cranch 180; Haniersleg r.
Lambert, 2 Johns. Ch. 508.
The late rebellion of the Southern
States was a war, within the meaning
of the law of nations, and was followed
by the same legal consequences as any
other war: The Prize Cases, 2 Black
666; The Venice, 2 Wal. 258; Mrs.
Alexander's Cotton, Id. 404; Mauran v.
Ins. Co., 6 Id. 1 ; The OuachitaCotton, Id.
521 ; Hangerv. Abbott, Id. 532 ; Coppell
v. Hall, 7 Id. 542; McKee v. U. S., 8
Id. 163; U. S. v.Grossmayer, 9 Id. 72.
According to the principal case, the
fact that an alien enemy has property
here, Subject to a mortgage lien or to
seizure by foreign attachment under a
state law, does not exempt him from the
operation of the rule, that he cannot be
sued in our courts. Notice to him of the
pendency of such a suit must be either by
a communication sent to him personally,
or by an advertisement directed to him in
anewspaper. The former, no court would
think of sustaining as a valid notice;
and the latter, in substance the same,
or worse, is held in the principal case to
be illegal and void, and so giving no
jurisdiction to the court. This question
seems first to have arisen in the Superior
Court of Chicago, in 1867, in two cases ;
one,where adecree of foreclosurehadbeen
entered, during the war, against a Confederate enemy, upon notice by publication in a newspaper; and the other,
where lands had been sold upon execution in foreign attachment, on a similar
notice to one who was a Confederate
enemy.

It was held by JAMESOl,

J.,

that the court acquired no jurisdiction
to render the decree or the judgment,
and that the defendant was in each case
entitled to relief: Conn. Ins. Co. v. Hall,
7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 606; Sibley v.
Mixer, decided at the same time, but unreported. The latter case was taken by
appeal to the Supreme Court df Illinois,
and the decision of the court below reversed.
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The same point arose in Maryland, in
1869, in two cases, of which the facts
were similar to those in the two last
cited, and it was held, that the newspaper notices, published, one in pursuance of a law of Maryland, and the
other, in pursuance of an order of court,
directing the publication of the same,
were sufficient to give jurisdiction to the
court: Dorsey v. Kyle, 30 Aid. 512;
Dorsey v. Dorsey, Id. 522. In neither
of these Maryland cases does it appear
that the fact of the hostile character of
the defendant was made known to the
court below. In Mixer v. Sibley, the
Illinois case, on the contrary, the fact
that the defendant in attachment was an
enemy within the Confederate lines,
appeared in the affidavit upon which the
writ was issued. It is difficult to see
upon what principle this decision can be
sustained. It seems, that such a judgment ought to be held void even in a
collateral proceeding; for, the effect of
the existence of a state of war, by the
law of nations, as well as by the Act of
Congress of July, 1861, was unquestionably to suspend all state laws permitting
acts and proceedings inconsistent therewith, or with the state of war. Could
the Illinois legislature empower the citizens of that state to trade or correspond
Mith, or, at pleasure, to go to, or come
from, or in any manner whatever communicate with, a public enemy? And it
is no answer to intimate, as do the court
in Xixer v. Sibley, with some severity,
that no case can be found in the books
sustaining the position taken by the
court below in that case. If it be conceded, that, before the late war, no such
case could be found, it does not follow
that the rule may not be as stated. It
may be, that no creditor ever before
sought to abuse the process of the courts
for such a purpose-a purpose that could
hardly 'ever be consummated without
rank inju.tice-or, it may be, that no,
court ever before ventured to deny the

rule established by the principal case.
Besides, the affirination so frequently
met with in our reports, that "no such
case can be found in the books," if it do
not turn out to be a mistake, so rarely
rests on a thorough study of the books,
that it is generally not entitled to much
weight. How the case is here, may be
inferred from the fact that the whole
tenor of the only authority cited in
M-ixer v. Sibley on this point-the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of The Rapid,
8 Cranch 155-is misstated by the court,
certainly through inadvertence - the
learned judge who delivered the opinion
citing, as employed by the court, language which was used only in argument
by.the counsel beaten in the case, and
the doctrine involved in which was repudiated, and the very contrary announced,
in the energetic terms quoted in the
opening part of this note, by Jon-soe,
J., who rendered the decision.
In 1870, a different, though analogous, question arose in the District
Court for the Southern District of New
York, touching the validity of a sale
under a power in a trust deed, as against
one who was, at the time, an enemy
within the Confederate lines, when such
sale was made, as provided in the deed,
upon a notice to the donor of the power
by publication in a newspaper. It was
held by BLATCHFORD, J., that the sale
was invalid-the notice, upon the principles since established in the principal
case, being held to be absolutely void:
The Kanawha Coal Co. v. The Kanawha
and Ohio Coal Co., published in pamphlet. The same point arose, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
in the case of Green v. Alexander, 3
Chicago Leg. News 123, and, upon the
authority of the former case, was decided
by McAtTuR, J., in the same way.

In the case of Harperv. Ely, decided
byWIr.LaAs, J., in the Chicago Circuit
Court, in 1870, it was held, that if it
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appeared that the defendant who was
seeking to redeem from a sale of his
property made upon a notice published
in a newspaper, while he was an enemy
within the Confederate lines, had voluntarily gone thither from a Northern State
to assume the hostile character, relief
would be denied. While a person
choosing to becbme a traitor, and leaving the North for that purpose, would
be morally more culpable than one who,
residing at the South, should have been
driven into treason, perhaps, by overwhelming force, it is*not clear that a
different rule should be applied to the
two, unless, perlaps, it should appear
that the purpose of assuming the hostile
character was to oust the court of jurisdiction. Why should a harder measure
of justice be meted to a traitor becoming
such voluntarily north, than to one
becoming such inlike manner south, of
a given line ? The facts are not very
fully stated, but it seems that the defendant's family went from Illinois, after
the outbreak of the war, to reside in
Kentucky, but that the defendant himself, before the war, went from one of
the western territories to a Southern
State, where he afterwards joined the
rebel army, voluntarily, as he admitted,
and from a sense of duty. If these were
the facts, the hypothesis of -his having
voluntarily gone South to enter the
rebel army, was unfounded, and it is
still harder to accept the decision as

authoritative: Harperv. Ely, 2 Chicago
Leg. News 350, with which compare
Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wal. 404,
419, in which the court declare, that the
personal dispositions, that is, I suppose,
the political sympathies, of parties will
not be inquired into, in questions of
capture, but rather their domicil or residence.
The question, to what remedy a party
is entitled, who is aggrieved by a wrongful assumption of jurisdiction, in this
class of cases, is not always an easy one
to answer. If, as in Mixer v. Sibley,
the error appeared on the record, it
might be corrected, upon writ of error,
in the appellate court, if the writ were
sued out in apt time. But where, as
seems to have been true in the Maryland
cases, the record did not show to the
lower court the hostile character of the
party proceeded against, the judgment
or decree would, on its face, appear to
be valjd, and would doubtless be so
held on appeal-unless, indeed, the facts
were admitted in the appellate court,
and a decision invoked, as though they
appeared of record. To reverse such a
ju*dgment, the injured party must have
recourse to a bill in chancery, as, a bill
in the nature of a bill of review, or a
bill to redeem, or to some other proceeding appropriate, under the circumstances, according to the local law.
J. A. J.

Supreme Court of the United States.
THE STATE OF TEXAS v. WHITE ET AL.
THE STATE OF TEXAS v. RUSSELL, EXECUTOR, ET AL.
An attorney or solicitor, who is also counsel in a cause, has a lien on moneys
collected therein for his fees and disbursements in the cause, and in any suit or
proceeding brought to recover other moneys covered by the same retainer.
If the attorney is guilty of no bad faith or improper conduct, and claims to
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'have a fair set-off against his client, which the latter refuses to allow, a motion to
pay into court the moneys collected will not be granted, but the parties will be left
to their action.
A party has a general right to change his attorney, and a rule for that purpose
will be granted, leaving to the attorney the advantage of any lien he may have
on papers or moneys in his hands as security for his fees and disbursements.
IN the first of these cases a motion was made for an order on
George W. Paschal, lately counsel fo' complainant, to pay to the
clerk of this court, for the benefit of complainant, the sum of
$47,825 in gold, alleged to have been received by him under the
decree in the case. In the other case motion is made that the
name of said Paschal be stricken from the docket as counsel for
the complainant, and that he be forbidden to interfere with the
case. Rules to show cause having been granted, with leave to
either party to file affidavits,*the respofident, Paschal, at the return of the rules, filed a statement, under oath, by way of cause
why the motions should not be granted.

T. J. Durant, for the motions.

A. Cr. Riddle, contrA.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRADLEY, J.-The application for an order on the respondent
to pay money into court is in the nature of a proceeding as for a
contempt. The application is based upon the power which the
court has over its own officers, to prevent them from, or punish
them for, committing acts of dishonesty or impropriety calculated
to bring contempt upon the administration of justice. For such
improper conduct the court may entertain summary proceedings
by attachment against any of its officers, and may, in its discretion, punish them by fine or imprisonment, or discharge them
from the functions of their offices, or require them to perform
their professional or official duty, under pain of discharge or
imprisonment.
The ground of the jurisdiction thus exercised
is the alleged misconduct of the officer. If an attorney have
collected money for his client, it is primd face his duty, after
deducting his own costs and disbursements, to pay it over to such
client; and his refusal to do this, without some good excuse, is
gross misconduct and dishonesty on his part, calculated to bring
discredit on the court and on the administration of justice. It is
this misconduct on which the court seizes as a ground of jurisdic-
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tion to compel him to pay the money, in conformity with his pro-*
fessional duty. The application against him in such cases is not
equivalent to an action of debt or assumpsit, but is a quasi criminal proceeding, in which the question is not merely whether the
attorney has received the money, but whether he has acted improperly and dishonestly in not paying it over. If no dishonesty
appears the party will be left to his action. The attorney may
have cross-demands against his client, or there may be disputes
between them on the subject, proper for a jury or a court of law
or equity to settle. If such appear to be the case and no professional misconduct be shown to exist, the court will not exercise
its summary jurisdiction. And, as the proceeding is in the nature
of an attachment for a contempt, the respondent ought to be permitted to purge himself by his oath. "If he lear himself by
his answers," says Justice Blackstone, "the complaint is totally
dismissed :" 4 Com. 288.
The answer of the respondent in this case sets forth the history
of the litigation instituted for the recovery of the Texas indemnity bonds and the part taken by him therein, both in the two
cases in which these motions are made and in other cases and
proceedings. A portion of this history is published in the report
of Texas v. White, 7 Wallace 700.
The answer admits that the respondent has received the sum
alleged, viz., $47,325 in gold, paid under the decrees of this
court, but alleges that his disbursements have been $13,855.98
(of which he gives an account by items), and that his charge for
services is $20,000 in the case of Texas v. White, Chiles et al.
alone, the reasonableness of which charge is corroborated by
affidavits of highly respectable counsel, and the balance and much
more he claims to be due to him from the state of Texas for his
services in relation to others of this same lot of indemnity bonds,
for the recovery of which he was originally retained by the
governor of Texas, as well as for other matters specified in the
answer, into the merits of which it is not necessary for us to go,
inasmuch as neither party has asked this court to settle or liquidate the accounts between them. All that we are concerned to
ascertain and decide on this motion is, whether the respondent
retains the money in his hands in bad faith, and is therefore
guilty of any such misconduct as will justify the court in interposing its authority in a summary way.
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It appears by the answer that at the breaking out of the rebellion there were in the treasury of Texas seven hundrdd bonds of
the United States, of $1000 each, belonging to the school fund
of the state, and known as the Texas indemnity bonds, being
part of the $5,000,000 of bonds delivered to the state at the time
of its admission into the Union. These bonds had not been endorsed by any governor of the state, as was required to make
them negotiable, but the military board nevertheless disposed of
them for the purpose of aiding in carrying on the war. One
hundred and thirty-six of these bonds came into the hands of
White, Chiles, and Others; about one hundred and fifty came
into the hands of Peabody & Co.; and various others into the
hands of other persons. It was claimed by these parties that,
having received the bonds in good faith, they were entitled to be
paid their full amount by the government of the United States,
and many of them were so paid. But it is claimed by the answer
-that, by the indefatigable exertions of the respondent payment
was stopped on a large number of the bonds, and suits were instituted against the parties who had received them or had received
the money secured by them. The respondent was employed by
A. J. Hamilton, the provisional governor of Texas in 1865, to
carry on these prosecutions. He first commenced a suit against
White, Chiles, and Others, in Texas, but, not being able to serve
them with process, he removed his operations to Washington,
and there commenced the suit in which the money in question
was recovered. He also took the proper steps and presented
elaborate arguments in the Treasury Department to prevent a
redemption of the bonds and to render the prosecution effectual,
being partially successful in this object, as before mentioned.
No stipulation was made with Governor Hamilton for any certain
fee for these services, but it was understood between them that
the respondent should charge such fees as the responsibility, expense, time, skill, and services should render proper. On the
faith of this understanding the respondent left his home in Texas,
where his practice was lucrative, and came to the North to attend
to this business. For a time, on a change of local administration
in Texas, other counsel were employed in the cases, but never, as
it appears, to the entire displacement of the respondent; and in
December 1867, he received the following special engagement
from E. M. Pease, then Governor of Texas: "Executive of
Texas, Austin, December 3d 1867, George W. Paschal, Esq.,
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Dear sir: Your two letters of the 9th and 14th of November
came together a day or two since. I had intended to write you
before this, and ask you to make a thorough examination of the
suit at Washington in behalf of the state against Chiles and Others
for certain United States bonds belonging to the school fund of
Texas, but a great press of business has prevented me from doing
it. I now wish you to make such an examination, and make a
full report thereon to this office as early as possible. In the mean
time you are fully authorized to take charge of and represent
the interest of the state in said suit. Your compensation will be
dependent upon the action of a future legislature, unless a recovery is had in the suit, in which event I shall feel authorized to
let you retain it out of the amount received. Yours, with respect,
E. M. PEASE." The power of the governor to make such an
arrangement is not disputed. The legislature, in October previ
ous, had passed an act expressly authorizing the governor to take
such steps as he might deem proper to recover possession of these
bonds, and to compromise with the parties holding them or
through whose hands they had passed. 4The respondent accepted
these terms, and continued to manage and conduct the subsequent
litigation, both in this case of White, Chiles, et als., and other
cases. In addition to the above letter, Governor Pease, on the 18th
of November 1868, exeoited to the respondent a power of attorney, constituting him his agent and attorney in fact, to represent
the state of Texas in any suits then pending or thereafter to be
instituted in any courts in the District of Columbia in relation to
any of the said bonds, with power to settle and compromise with
any of the parties. Under these various retainers and engagements the respondent gave his attention for several years to the
recovery of the bonds, and finally succeeded in recovering the
amount before mentioned from the defendants in the case of
White, Chiles and Others, and made considerable progress in negotiating a settlement of those which had come to the hands of
Peabody & Co. In June 1869, Governor Pease visited Washington; and, on being made acquainted with the respondent's proceedings, approved of the same, and entered into a further
arrangement with him in relation to three hundred of the said
bonds which had been carried to Europe by one Swisher (of which
the Peabody bonds were a part), by which he agreed that the respondent should be paid, for carrying the litigation through, twentyfive per cent. on the one hundred and forty-nine bonds received
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by Peabody & Co., and twenty per cent. on the remainder, being
one hundred and fifty-one bonds in the hands of Droege & Co.
Under this arrangement the respondent continued liis negotiations with these parties, and was, as he believed, near effecting a
satisfactory arrangement and settlement with them, when, on or
about the 27th of January 1870, he received a telegram from
Edmund J. Davis, who had been appointed provisional governor
of Texas in place of Governor Pease, that his appointment as
agent for the state of Texas was revoked. A letter from the
governor was received shortly after, containing a formal revocation of the respondent's authority as such agent and of the power
to represent the governor of Texas given to him by Governor
Pease. The respondent alleges that this interference on the part
of Governor Davis put an end to the negotiations for a settlement with Droege & Co., and Dabney, Morgan & Co. (who had
received the money on the Peabody bonds), and was entirely unauthorized by the governor, and entitles the respondent to receive
the contingent fees of twenty-five and twenty per cent., as before
mentioned, and to continue as attorney and counsel in the case
until his demand is settled.
The respondent also claims that the state of Texas is indebted
to him in a balance of $17,577 for publishing, binding, and delivering to the secretary of state of Texas four hundred copies
each of five volumes of reports of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Texas, which he reported under the laws of the state.
He also claims that the state owes him $1000 for bringing two
suits in the District Court of Travis county, Texas, and prosecuting appeals therein to the Supreme Court of the state.
On the part of the state of Texas it is shown, not only that the
governor revoked Mr. Paschal's aiithority, but that he has appointed Mr. Durant as attorney and agent of the state in his stead,
with authority to receive all moneys due to the state; and that
Mr. Durant has made due demand of Mr. Paschal for the moneys
in his hands, and has required him not to intermeddle further in
the suit of Texas v. Russell, Executor of Peabody, et al.
Upon a consideration of the facts disclosed by the answer and
affidavits, the result to which the court has come, in relation to
the money retained by the respondent, is, that he has not been
guilty of any misconduct which calls for the exercise of summary
jurisdiction. We see no reason to suppose that he is not acting
in good faith; and whether his claim to the entire amount be
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valid or not (a point which we are not called upon to decide), it is
clear that the claim is honestly made. The case is one in which
the parties'should be left to the usual remedy at law, where the
questions of law and fact which are mooted between them can
be more satisfactorily settled than they can be in a summary proceeding.
A good deal has been said in the argument on the question
whether the respondent has, or has not, a lien on the moneys in
his hands. We do not think that the decision of this motion
depends alone on that question. For, even if he has not a lien
co-extensive with the sum received, yet if he has a fair and honest
set-off, which ought in equity to be allowed by the complainant,
that fact has a material bearing on the implied charge of misconduct which underlies the motion for an order to pay over
the money; and when, as in this case, there exists a technical
barrier to prevent the respondent from instituting an action
against his client (for it is admitted that he cannot sue the state
of Texas for any demand which he may have against it), it would
seem to be against all equity to compel him to pay over the fund
in his hands, and thus strip him of all means of bringing his
claims to an issue. Whilst, on the other hand, no difficulty exists
in the state instituting an action against him for money had and
received, and thus bringing the legality of his demands to a final
determination.
But in the judgment of the court the respondent has a lien
upon the fund in his hands for at least the amount of his fees and
disbursements in relation to these indemnity bonds. His original
retainer by Governor Hamilton related to all the bonds indiscriminately, and much of the service rendered by him has been rendered
indiscriminately in relation to them all. With regard to the
White and Chiles bonds the agreement of Governor Pease was
express, that in case of recovery the respondent might retain his
compensation out of the amount received. In England, and in
several of the states, it is held that an attorney or solicitor's lien
on papers or money of his client in possession extends to the
whole balance of his account for professional services. But
whether that be or be not the better rule, it can hardly be contended that in this case it does not extend to all the fees and
disbursements incurred in relation to all of these indemnity bonds.
And in this country the distinction between attorney or solicitor
a:d counsel is practically abolished in nearly all the states. The
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lawyer in charge of a case acts both as solicitor and counsel. His
services in the one capacity and the other cannot be well distinguished; and, as a general rule, counsel fees, as well as those
of attorney or solicitor, constitute a legal demand, for which an
action will lie. And whilst, as between party and party in a
cause, the statutory fee bill fixes the amount of costs to be recovered, as between attorney or solicitor and client a different
rule obtains. The claim of the attorney or solicitor in the latter
case, even in England, extends to all proper disbursements made
in the litigation, and to the customary and usual fees for the ser'ices rendered.
The fee bill adopted by Congress in 1853 recognises this general
rule, and, in fact, adopts it. By the first section of that act it is
expressly declared that nothing therein shall be construed to prohibit attorneys, solicitors, and proctors from charging to and receiving from their clients, other than the government, such reasonable
compensation for their services, in addition to the taxable costs, as
may be in accordance with general usage in their respective states,
or may be agreed upon between the parties.
The change in the rule relative to fees and costs has been
gradually going on for a long period. In Pennsylvania counsel
fees could not be recovered in an action so late as 1819, when the
case of Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. & R. 411, was decided. But in
the subsequent case of Foster v. Jack, decided in 1835, 4 Watts
834, the contrary was held, in a very able opinion delivered by
Chief Justice GIBSON. And in Balsbaugh v. -Fraser,19 Penna.
95, Chief Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the court in a
series of propositions which strongly commend themselves for
their good sense and just discrimination. The court there held
that in Pennsylvania an attorney or counsellor may recover whatever his services are reasonably worth; that such claim, like any
other which arises out of a contract, express or implied, may be
defalked against an adverse demand; that an attorney, who has
money in his hands which he has recovered for his client, may
deduct his fees from the amount; that if he retain the money
with a fraudulent intent, the court will inflict summary punishment upon him ; but if his answer to a rule against him convinces
the court that it was held back in good faith, and believed not to
be more than an honest compensation, the rule will be dismissed,
and the client remitted to a jury trial.
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In New York counsel fees have always been recoverable on a
quantum meruit: Stevens & Cagger v. Adams, 23 Wend. 57;
s. C., 26 Wend. 451. In this case Stevens recovered $300 for
counsel fees and $50 for maps made to be' used in a cause. It
was held by the court that the fee bill, which declares it unlawful
to demand or charge more than therein limited, has reference
only to the question of costs as between party and party, and
not as between counsel and client. The arguments of Chancellor
Walworth and Senators Lee and Verplanck, in the court of errors,
on the general subject, were exceedingly lucid and able, going to
show that in this country the counsellor is regarded as entitled to
a fair remuneration for his services, and to recover the same in
an action, either upon an express or implied contract. The Code
has since abolished the fee bill, and left attorneys and solicitors
to make their own bargains with their clients. But the courts
have held that this change has not affected the attorney's lien,
even on the judgment recovered, for the amount which it has
been agreed he shall receive. In one case he was to receive onehalf the amount to be recovered. Judgment was obtained for
$1179, and the court held that the attorney had a lien on this
judgment for his half of it, and that the defendant could not
safely settle with the plaintiff without paying him: Rooney v.
Second Avenue Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. Rep. 368.
In Texas the law has been held substantially the same. In
the case of Casey v. March, 30 Texas 180, it was decided that
an attorney has a lien on the papers and documents received
from his client, and on money collected by him in the course of
his profession, for the fees and disbursements on account of such
claims, and for his compensation for his services in the collection
of the money. If, as the respondent contends, this case is to be
governed by the law of Texas, it is decidedly in favor of his lien,
at least to the extent of his services and disbursements in relation
to the indemnity bonds. (See the cases of Kinsey v. Stewart, 14
Texas 457; Myers v. Crocket, Id. 257; Ratcliff v. Baird, Id.
43; Hill v. Cunningham, 25 Texas 25.) As the original retainer was made in Texas, we are inclined to the opinion that
the rights of parties are to be regulated by the laws of that state.
But, if thiis be not the case, this court would be guided by what
it deems to be the prevailing rule in this country; and, according
to this rule, we are of opinion that the respondent has a lien on
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the fund in his hands for his disbursements and professional fees
in relation to the indemnity bonds; and that, in retaining the said
fund for the purpose of procuring a settlement of his claim, he has
done nothing to call for the summary interposition of this court.
The motion for an order to compel the respondent to pay to the
clerk of this court the money received by him, is therefore 4enied.
The other motion we think should be granted. The respondent,
as appears from his answer, was employed by Governor Pease to
proceed with and carry through the litigation relating to the three
.hundred bonds in the hands of Peabody & Co. and Droege & Co.,
with a stipulation to receive twenty-five per cent. of the amount that
might be recovered on one hundred and forty-nine of the bonds,
and twenty per cent. of the amount to be recovered on the remainder. Granting it to be true that this contract was definitely
concluded (although there seems to have been some uncertainty
as to one part of it), it cannot be seriously claimed that the complainant is so fixed and tied up by the arrangement that it cannot
change its attorney and employ such other counsel as it may see
fit, always being responsible, of course, for the consequences of
breaking its contract with the respondent. Whether in discharging him the state has made itself liable for the whole contingent
fee agreed upon, or only for so much as the respondent's actual
disbursements and services were worth up to the time of his discharge, or for nothing whatever, it is not necessary for us to
decide. That question can be more properly determined in some
other proceeding instituted for the purpose. The relations between counsel and client are of a very delicate and confidential
character, and unless the utmost confidence prevails between
them the client's interests must necessarily suffer. Whether in
any case, in virtue of an agreement made, an attorney may successfully resist an application of his client to substitute another
in his place, we need not stop to inquire. In this case one of the
states of this Union is the litigant, and moves to change its
attorney for reasons which are deemed sufficient by its responsible
officers. It is abundantly able, and it must be presumed will be
willing, to compensate the respondent for any loss he may sustain
in not being continued in the management of the cause. The
court cannot hesitate in permitting the state to appear and conduct its causes by such counsel as it shall choose to represent it,
leaving the respondent to such remedies, for the redress of any
V o.
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injury he may sustain, as may be within his power. Under the
decision which we have just made in relation to the money in his
hands, he will be able to retain that fund and any papers and
documents belonging to his client until his claim shall be adjudicated in such action as the state may see fit to institute therefor.
Ab order to discharge the respondent as solicitor and counsel
for the complainant in the second case will be granted.
No costs will be allowed to either party on these motions.
The subject of the lien of attorneys
and counsel for fees will be found exhaustively discussed in the note to Carpenter v. Sixth Av. Railroad Co., I Am.

Law Reg. N. S. 410, and the right of
counsel in the American states to sue for
fees, in the note to Kennedy v. Broun, 2
Am. Law Reg. 357.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
CATHARINE ALTER'S APPEAL.
Where two persons agreed to make mutual wills, but by mistake each signed
the will of the other, and one died: Held, that he died intestate.
There being no will to reform, the legislature could not give a court power to
establish it upon proof of the intent of the parties ; such an act would be the
divesting of a vested estate.

THIS was an appeal by Catherine Alter from the decree of
the Register's Court of the county of Philadelphia.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court, which was
delivered by
AGNEW, J.-This is a hard case, but it seems to be.without a
remedy. An aged couple, husband and wife, having no lineal
descendants, and each owning property, determined to make their
wills in favour of each other, so that the survivor should have all

they possessed.

Their wills were drawn precisely alike, mutatis

mutandis, and laid down on a table for execution. Each signed
a paper, which was duly witnessed by three subscribing witnesses;
and the papers were enclosed in separate envelopes, endorsed and
sealed up. After the death of George A. Alter, the envelopes
were opened, and it was found that each had, by mistake, signed
the will of the other. To remedy this error, the legislature, by
an act approved the 23d of February 1870, conferred authority
upon the Register's Court-of this county to take proof of the
mistake and proceed as a court of chancery to reform the will of
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George A. Alter, and decree accordingly. Proceedings were had,
resulting in a decision of the Register's Court, that there was no
will, and that the act to reform it was invalid, the estate having
passed to and vested in the collateral line of kindred. From this
decree an appeal has been taken by Catherine Alter. On this
statement, the first inquiry is, was the paper signed by George A.
Alter his will? Was it capable of being reformed by the Register's Court? The paper drawn up for his will was not a will in
law, for it was not "signed by him at the .end thereof," as the
Wills Act requires. The paper he signed was not his will, for
it was drawn up for the will of his wife, and gave the property to
himself. It was insensible and absurd. It is clear, therefore,
that he had executed no will, and there was nothing to be reformed. There was a mistake, it is true, but that mistake was
the same as if he had signed a blank sheet of paper. He had
written his name, but not to his will. He had never signed his
will, and the signature where it was, was the same as if he had
not written it at all. He therefore died intestate, and his property descended as at law. The difficulty lies not in the want of
power of a Court of Chancery to reform a mistake in an existing
will, where full equity power to that end is conferred by the law,
but in the want of power to give an existence to that which had
none before. And the objection to the validity of the act conferring the authority to decree the will, lies not in a want of power
in the legislature to establish a will upon parol proof of the fact
of making it, and of the intent to execute the proper paper, but
in its want of power to divest estates already vested at law on the
death of George A. Alter without a will. There being no will,
it is evident that the effect of any subsequent legislation, call it
by what name we may, is simply to divest estates. That this
cannot be done is abundantly proved in Greenough v. Greenough,
1 Jones 494; McCarty v. Hoffman, 11 Harris 508; Norman v.
Heist, 5 W. & S. 171; Bolton v. efohnes, 5 Barr 145; -Dale v.
Metcalf, 9 Barr 108; and other cases. The first two cases are
directly in point, for it was held therein that the Act of Assembly
validating wills where the testator had made his mark instead of
signing his name, or expressly directing it to be signed for him,
could not reach the case of a will so executed, where the testator
had died before the passage of the Act.
The decree of the Register's Court is therefore affirmed.

LOCK CO. v. RAILROAD CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hfamp8ire.
NASHUA LOCK COMPANY v. WORCESTER AND NASHUA RAIL.
ROAD COMPANY.
Where several common carriers are associated in a continuous line of transportation, and in the course of the business, goods are carried through the connected line for one price under an agreement by which the freight-money is divided

among the associated carriers, in proportions fixed by the agreement; if the carrier
at one end of the line receives goods to be transported through marked for a consignee at the other end of the line, and on delivery of the goods takes pay for
transportation through, the carrier, who so receives the goods, is bound to carry
them, or see that they are carried, to their final destination, and is liable for an
accidental loss happening in any part of the connected line.
ASSUMPSIT to recover for ten cases of loclcs. Plea, the general issue.
The cause was submitted on the following agreed state of facts :The cases were marked for Wiesbuslthabatt & Co., New York, and
were delivered to the defendants, as freight, at Nashua, N. H., to be
transported over their road from Nashua to Worcester, Massachusetts,
and there delivered to the Norwich and Worcester Railroad, to be forwarded by the usual course of transportation to New York city, and the
entire freight from Nashua to New York was paid by the plaintiffs to
the defendants.
The defendants are a corporation in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, owning and operating a railroad between Nashua and Worcester,
which forms a connection with the Norwich and Worcester Railroad and
the line of steamers across Long Island Sound to New York from Norwich, Connecticut, known as the "Norwich and New York Transportation Company." The road of the defendants extends from Nashua to
Worcester; the road of the Norwich and Worcester Railroad extends
from Worcester to New London, from which point the boats of the
Steam Boat Company run to New York. The defendants are accustomed to receive freight at Nashua destined and directed to New York
and to deliver it to the Norwich Railroad as aforesaid. By an arrangement among these corporations the price paid for freight forwarded from
Nashua to New York over the line is divided among them in accordance
with an agreement.
The cases were forwarded by the defendants and by the Norwich and
Worcester Railroad and delivered to the Transportation Company, and
by them put on board the steamer "City of Norwich," which came in
collision with a sailing-vessel on the Sound, took fire, and with the cargo,
including the ten cases, was consumed. The value of the steamer has
been ascertained, and a pro ratd share assigned to the plaintiffs, who
have declined to accept it. In case judgment should be for the plaintiff,
the value of the goods lost is to be determined by an auditor.
A. TV. Sawyer, for the plaintiffs.
G. Y. Sawyer, for defendants.
PERLEY, C. J.-According to the agreed case the three corporations,
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the Worcester and Nashua Railroad, the Norwich and Worcester Railroad, and the Norwich and New York Transportation Company, were
engaged as common carriers in the business of transporting goods
between Nashua and New York in a continuous line under an agreement by which they divided the price paid for transportation through
in proportions fixed by the agreement. The agreement is not before
us; but from the general statement of it in the case it must be inferred
that the parcies to it were mutually bound to transport goods on their
connected line according to the direction given by the owner, when
they were received for transportation in the usual course of the business by any one of the parties. In this case it would have been a
violation of the agreement among the parties to the continuous line, if
either the Norwich and Worcester Railroad or the Transportation Company had refused to receive and transport the goods towards their destination in the usual course of the business as they were marked and
directed when they were received by the defendants.
The contract between the plaintiffs and defendants must be implied
-from the facts stated in the agreed case. There was no special agreement, written or oral, that the goods should be carried to New York,
nor that the responsibility of the defendants should end on delivery to
the Norwich and Worcester Railroad. The general question is whether
the defendants undertook for the transportatibn of the goods through
to New York, or only agreed to carry and deliver, or tender, them to
the Norwich and Worcester Railroad.
Had the defendants corporate authority to contract for the transportation of the goods beyond their own line? We have no hesitation
in holding that railroads may contract to carry goods and passengers
beyond their own lines. They could not answer the main objects of
their incorporation without the exercise of this power. They are laid
out and established with reference to connections in business with other
extended lines of transportation, and the power to contract for transportation over the connected lines is implied in the general grant of
corporate authority. On this point the authorities are nearly unanimous.
It has been held otherwise in Connecticut by the opinion of three judges
against two : Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. Railroad, 22 Conn. 1; Elmore
v. The Naugatuck Railroad,23 Conn. 457; The Naugatuck Railroad
v. The Button Company, 24 Conn. 468. But in a later case, Converse
v. The-Norwich & X Y. Transportation Company, 33 Conn. 166, the

court in that state have shown some disposition to recede from the doctrine of their earlier cases. No other authorities are cited by the defendants to this point, and I have found no others that sustain their
view of this question. The authorities the other way are numerous
and decisive: Muschamp v. The Lancaster& Preston Railway, 8 A. &
W. 421 ; Weed v. The S. & S. Railroad,19 Wend. 524; The . & 1l.
Bank v. The Ch. Transportation Company, 23 Vermont 186; UleCluer v. A & L. Railroad, 13 Gray 124; Rogers v. R. & B. Railroad, 27 Vermont 110; Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610; Perkins v.

The P. S. & P. Railroad,47 Maine 573; and railroads may contract
for transportation beyond the limits of the states in which they are
established: He Cluer v. The X. & .T. Railroad,13 Gray 124; Burtis
v. B. & S. L. Railroad,24 New York 369; and when a railroad makes
a contract for transportation beyond its own line it will be presumed
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that it had authority to do it: McCluer v. At. & L. Railroad, 13 Gray
124.
In the agreed case it is said the goods were received to be forwarded,
&c., and from this phrase an argument is drawn that the agreement of
the defendants was to forward to the next party in the line and not to
carry through to New York. But here was no express agreement in
any particular terms, and we are not called on to interpret the language
used in any contract. The nature of the undertaking must be inferred
from the facts stated in the agreed case, and cannot be determined by
the phrase used in stating them. Even in a written contract, where
the term forwarded is used, if the thing to be done belongs to the
business of a carrier, he will be charged as such. In Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610, the court say: "The criticism of the defendant on
the word forwarded used in the contract is not just.. It applies to the
whole distance, as well to those portions of the route where other
parties were owners of the vessels, as to that portion where he employed
his own means of transportation. He was to forward the goods from
New.York to Fairport, not to Buffalo, which he now says was the terminus of his own immediate route. The words used by him can only
mean that he was to carry or transport the goods, and whether in his
own vessels or in those of others was perfectly immaterial to the plaintiff." In Schroeder v. The Hudson River Railroad, 5 Duer 55, the
defendants gave a receipt for goods "to be forwarded per Hudson River
Freight Train to Chicago ;" and under this receipt it was held that the
defendants were bound to carry the goods to Chicago. So, in the recent
case of Buckland v. The Adams Express Copany, 97 Mass. 124, the
defendants were charged as common carriers, though they described
themselves in the contract under which they received the goods, as
"Express Forwarders." In the present case the undertaking of the
defendants must be implied from the facts stated in the agreed case,
and the particular language used in stating them is of no materiality.
Since the introduction of steam as the means of transportation by
land and water, the general question raised in this case has been much
considered in different jurisdictions, and there is no little confusion and
contradiction of authority respecting the rule which shall govern the
rights and liabilities of the parties, where goods are put in the course of
transportation to distant places through connected lines associated in the
business of common carriers. Where such lines are engaged in carrying passengers and their luggage the several parties to the continuouti
line incur, it would seem, the same liabilities for damage and loss of the
luggage as in cases where they carry goods only: Darlingv. The Boston & Worcester Railroad. 11 Allen 295; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17
New York 312; Weed v. The Railroad,19 Wend. 534; Thd Ill. Central Railroad v. Copeland, 24 111. 332; .Ill. Central Railroad v. Johnson, 34 Ill. 382.
In England and in several of the United States, it has been held
that when a railroad or other common carrier receives goods marked or
otherwise directed for a place beyond the carrier's own line, this alone
is pritml facie evidence of a contract to carry the goods to their final
destination, though the freight money for transportation through is not
paid to the carrier that receives the goods, and though he is not shown
to have any connection in business with other parties beyond his own
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line: .Mischamp v. The Lancaster and PrestonRailway, 8 AT. & W.
421; Watson v. The Ambergate, Nottingam and Boston Railway,
3 Law & Equity 497 ; Collins v. The Bristol and Exeter Railway, 11
Exchequer 790, s. c., 7 House of Lords Cases 194; Coxon v. The
Great Western Railway, 5 Hurlstone & N. 274. These and several
other cases show that in England, after the fullest discussion in all the
courts, the rule is firmly established that a carrier who receives goods
marked for a place beyond his own line is primd facie bound to carry
them as directed to their final destination, and it is there held that the
contract in such case is entire, and with the first carrier alone; that
until some colinection in the business, which has the general nature, if
not the technical character, of a partnership, appears between him and
the subsequent carriers, no action can be maintained against them by
the owner, though the goods were lost or damaged on their part of the

route.
I have not met with an American case, in which the rule has been
pressed to the extent of holding that the owner cannot come on any
carrier, by whose default the loss or damage actually happened. There
are, however, numerous authorities in the United States for the general
rule of Muschamp v. The.Railway, that the receipt of goods marked
for a place beyond the line of the carrier who receives them, implies a
contract to carry them to their final destination, though no connection
in business is shown with other carriers beyond, and though the price
for transportation through is not paid in advance,
In Foy v. The Troy &,Boston Railroad,24 Barb. 382, the doctrine
of the case is stated in the head note to be that "where a railroad
company receives for transportation property addressed to a person at a
point beyond the terminus of the road, he will be understood, in the
absence of any proof to the contrary, to have agreed to deliver the property in the same order and condition in which it was received, to the
consignee." The court say, "it was no part of the plaintiff's business
to inquire how many different corporations made up the entire line of
road between Troy and Burlington, or, having ascertained this, to determine at his peril, which of said companies had been guilty of the
negligence which resulted in the injury to his wagon." In Schroeder
v. Tle Hudson River Railroad,5 Duer 55, the agent of the defendants gave the following receipt at New York: "Received of Schroeder
six boxes-to be forwarded per Hudson River Railroad freight train to
Chicago, Illinois;" and it was held that the defendants under this receipt
were bound to transport the goods to Chicago. No connection in business
with other carriers was relied on. In Kyle v. The Laurens Railroad,
10 Rich. (Law) 282, the rule of Muschamp v. The Railway was approved. O'NEALL, J., says: "The case of Muschamp v. The Lancaster
& Preston Junction Railway states, I think, the true rule." The rule
of Muschamp v. The Railway was approved and adopted in the Central
Railroad v. Copland, 24 Illinois 332, in which it was held that "a
railroad corporation selling tickets through over its own and other
roads is liable for the safety of passengers and their baggage to the
The case was put on the same ground as when
point of destination."
goods are received marked for a place beyond the line of the carrier that
receives them. The court say: "We are inclined to yield to the force
of thc reasoning of the English courts, on principles of public conveni-
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ence, if no other, and to hold when a carrier receives goods to carry
marked for a particular place, he is bound to carry and deliver at that
place. By accepting the goods so marked he impliedly agrees so to do,
and he ought to be answerable for that loss." In the later case of The
Central Railroad v. Johnson, 33 Illinois 382, it was decided in the
same state that "when a carrier receives goods to carry marked for a
particular place, he is bound under an implied agreement from the
mark or direction to carry to and deliver at that. place, though it be a
place beyond his own line of carriage." In The Detroit & Milwaukee
Railroadv. The F. & X. Bank, 20 Wis. 122, the railroad gave a receipt
for the goods directed to New York, but the receipt provided that the railroad should not be liable beyond their own road, and it was held that by
an express agreement a carrier might limit his liability to his own road,
when he receives goods marked for a place beyond it. The road was
in that case discharged upon the ground of an express agreement that
it should not be liable beyond its own line, from which the inference
is plain that, in the absence of an express agreement controlling the
contract otherwise implied from the receipt of the goods marked for a
place beyond its line, the road will be liable for a loss happening
beyond. In Angle v. The Mississippi & Missouri Railroad, 9 Iowa
487, it was decided that "when a common carrier receives goods marked
for a particular place beyond the terminus of his route, unaccompanied
by any direction as to their transportation and delivery except such as
may be inferred from the marks, he is primafaciebound to carry and
deliver them according to the marks."
St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend. 660, is a strong authority for
the rule that when goods are received by a carrier marked for a place
beyond his line, he is bound to carry them to their final destination, if
there is nothing to control the contract implied by the receipt of the
goods so marked. NELSON, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court,
says: "It appears to me such a contract is fairly to be inferred from
the receipt of the captain in the absence of any explanation. The box
was directed to J. Petrie, Little Falls, Herkimer county, indicating
plainly to whom the plaintiffs were desirous of sending it, and was
delivered on board for the express purpose of transhipment to him; and
without any qualification or explanation the agent received the article
and gave his receipt, in effect saying to the plaintiff, I will take and
deliver it at the place of destination according to the direction. So the
plaintiffs must have understood the contract. It is the plain interpretation of the transaction. If the defendants had intended to limit their
duty as common carriers short of the place of destination, they should
in some way have indicated to the plaintiff this intent." The judgment
of the Supreme Court in this case was reversed by the Sexiate, 6 Hill
157, upon the ground that the court should have received evidence of
a custom controlling the general effect of the receipt of the goods
marked for the place of destination, though the custom was not known
to the plaintiff; leaving the doctrine untouched that the receipt of the
goods so marked in the absence of evidence to explain and control the
transaction would imply an agreement to carry to the place for which
they were marked.
The American authorities above cited sustain the doctrine of ILSchamp v. The Railway, that when a carrier receives goods marked for
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a place beyond his own line, he is, priml facie and in the absence of
other evidence, bound by an implied contract to carry the goods to the
place for which they are marked, though he has no connection in business beyond his own line and though he does not receive pay for transportation through.
There is another class of American cases which hold that the mere
receipt of goods marked for transportation beyond the line of the party
that receives them is not evidence of a contract to carry beyond his
own line, if he has no connection in business with carriers beyond; but
that, if several carriers associate in a continuous line, carry goods for
one price through, and divide the freight-money among them in an agreed
ratio, though they may not be technically partners, but only quasi partners, yet as to third persons who intrust goods to them for transportation
they are jointly liable for a loss that happens in any part of the cot,tinuous iine, though the freight-money is not paid to the first carrier on
delivery of the goods to him.
In Champion v. .Bostwick, 11 Wend. 571, s.c., 18 Id. 174, several
proprietors of different sections in a connected line of stage coaches
divided the receipts of the whole route in proportion to the miles run
by each; and it was held that they were jointly liable as partners for
an injury to a third person, not a passenger, caused by the negligence
of one of them. It is to be observed that in this case the receipts of
the way as well as the through travel were brought into the account;
and on this, a distinction has been taken between that case and one
where the receipts of the through travel only are divided; and for that
reason it has been said that in a case like the present there is no
partnership and no joint liability. But as to parties who deal with the
through line, it is of no consequence how the other business is managed,
or whether any other business is done by the associated carriers. At
most the distinction is merely technical and has no substance. Nor
am I acquainted with any legal principle to prevent one engaged in a
general business from having a partner in one distinct part of it, like
the through business in this case, without bringing all his business of
the same kind into the partnership account. I take it to be no uncommon thing for a trader to have a partner in his business done at one
place, who has no concern in his business of the same kind transacted
at other places; for attorneys to form partnerships limited to certain parts
of their business, and merchants, in the voyages, or in a single voyag,

of one ship.
Hart v. The Rensselaer & Saratoga Railroad is to the point that
"where three separate railroad companies owning distinct portions of a
continuous railroad route between two termini run their cars over the
whole road, employing the same agents to sell passenger tickets, and
receive luggage to be carried over the entire road, an action may be
maintained against any one of them for loss of luggage received at one
terminus to be carried over the whole road." SiiITH. J., delivering
the opinion of the court in McDonald v. Ihe Western Railroad,34
New York 501, 502, says: "We may judicially take notice of the fact
that the vast business of inland transportation of goods is carried on
mainly upon routes formed by successive lines belonging to different
owners, each of whom carries the goods over his own line and delivers
them to the next. Many of these routes extend over thousands of
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miles. Their proprietors unite and receive goods for- transportation
upon the promise express or implied that they shall be carried safely to
the place of delivery. The owner has lost sight of his goods when he
delivers them to the first carrier and has no means of learning their
whereabouts till he or the consignee is informed of their arrival at the
place of destination."
In ll'bert v. The Erie Railroad,12 New York 256, it was said that
"where a carrier is in the habit of receiving and forwarding goods
directed to any particular place, an agreement on his part to take them
there has been presumed; but where these operations are entirely disconnected, there is no partnership." In Bradford v. The Railroad
(lompany, 7 Rich. (Law) 201, it was held that "an advertisement of a
through line and the course of the business is evidence to charge all the
roads engaged in the continuous line of transportation as jointly liable
for carriage through the whole route." REDFIELD, 0. J., in delivering
the opinion of the court in The F. M. Bank v. The Transportation
(lompany, 23 Vermont 131, speaking of lWeed v. The S. & S. Railroad,
19 Wend. 534, says, "that case is readily reconciled with the general
rule that such carrier is only bound to the end of his own route, by the
consideration that in this case there was a kind of partnershipconnection
between the first company and the other companies constituting the
entire route, and also that the first carrier took pay and gave a ticket
through, which is most relied on by the court; and in such cases where
the first company gives a ticket and takes pay through it may be fairly
considered equivalent to an undertaking to carry throughout the entire
route." in a note to this case by REDFIELD, U. J., he says, "in that
case ( Weed v. The Railroad) the court seem to put the case more upon
the fact of taking fare and giving a ticket through, which in practice is
seldom or never done except where there is a quasipartnershipthroughout the route." This would seem to be a strpng authority that where
there is a connected line of carriers, and a guasi, though it may not be
technical and legal partnership, they are liable jointly for carriage
through the whole connected route.
By the statute of New York, enacted in 1847, "whenever two or
more railroads are connected together any company owning either of
said roads receiving freight to be transported to any place in the line of
either of said roads shall be liable as common carriers for the delivery
of such freight at such place." This statute has received a liberal construction and been held to make a railroad in New York liable for a loss
on a road in the connected line beyond the limits of the state: Burtis
v. The Buffalo and State Line Railroad, 24 New York 269; but not
to discharge an intermediate carrier for loss caused by his own fault :
Smith v. The N. Y. Central Railroad, 43 Barb. 225.
In The Cincinnati H. & D. Railroad v. Speat, 2 Duval 4, it was
decided that "where several parties are associated for the transportation of freight from Louisville to New York, executing through bills of
lading and charging through freight, they will be chargeable as common
carriers between those points; and in such cases public justice and commercial policy require a stringent construction against any intermediate
irresponsibility as common carriers." Two points were decided in this
case: that the defendants were liable as common carriers for transportation through to New York; and that on the facts of the case they held
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the go9ds as common carriers and not as warehousemen. The court
say: "The facts conduce to prove that the appellants, associated as they
were with steamboats and other. carriers from Louisville to Cincinnati
as joint transporters between those points, and jointly charging through
freight and giving through receipts, were in the popula and technical
impora common carriers to the whole extent between those termini."
This reasoning applies with full force to the present case.
In 2 Redfield on Railways 104, the. learned author sums up the
result of the American cases on this particular point as follows: "The
American cases upon the subject, with rare exceptions, recognise the
right of a railroad company to enter into special contracts to carry
goods beyoad the line of their road; and where do'erent roads are
united in one continuous route such an undertaking, when goods are
received and booked for any part of the line, is almost a matter of
course." In the present case the defendants were united in a continuous line to New York; the goods were received marked, which
must be equivalent to booked, for New York; and the case would seem
to fall clearly within the rule laid down in Redfield as the result of the
American authorities.
There is still another class of cases, in which it is held that the fact
of a carrier's receiving pay for transportation to a place beyond his own
line implies a contract to carry to that place. In the case of jde v.
The Trent & Afersey Navigation Company, 5 T. R. 389, decided in
1793, the marginal note is as follows: "Common carriers from A to B,
charge and receive for cartage to the consignee's house at B from a
warehouse there, where they usually unloaded, but which did not belong
to them; they must answer for the goods if destroyed in the warehouse
by an accidental fire, although they allow all the profits of the cartage
to another person, and that circumstance were known to the consignee."
The four judges delivered their opinions seriatim and all agreed that the
charge for cartage to the house of the consignee "put the case out of
all doubt," and bound the carriers who made the charge, to carry the
goods to their final destination. In answer to the argument that the
carriers acted as agents of the owner in forwarding the goods beyond
their own line, Mr. Justice BULLER said: "According to the defendants' own argument great inconvenience would result to the public from
adopting the other rule. According to their argument there must be
two contracts, where goods are sent by coach or wagon. But I think
the same argument tends to establish the necessity of three; one with
the carrier, another with the innkeeper, and a third with the porter.
But in fact there is but one contract; there is nothing like any contract
or communication between any other person than the owner of the
goods and the carrier. But I rely on the charge which the defendants
compelled the plaintiff to pay before they would engage to deliver the
goods. The different proprietors may divide the profits among them. selves in any way they choose, but they cannot exonerate themselves
from their liability to the owner of the goods." This case, coming
before the agitation of these questions on the introduction of steam as
a motive power, and decided on the general principle applicable to the
liability of carriers at common law, is certainly of very great weight.
It decides that when a carrier receives goods to be transported beyond
his own line and takes pay for carrying them to their final destination,
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he agrees to do what he has been paid for doing; and it repudiates the
fanciful theory of an agency for the owner to forward the goods and in
his behalf procure them to be carried by others.
In Weed v. The Saratoga & Schenectady Railroad,19 Wend. 534,
the plaintiff's agent took passage at Saratoga in the Saratoga & Schenectady Railroad for Albany and paid his fare to Albany. The route
to Albany consisted of the defendants' and the Mohawk & Hudson
R iver Railroad. When the agent arrived at Albany his trunk containing money of the plaintiff was missing, and this action was brought to
recover for the loss. One ground taken for the defendants was that
there was no evidence the trunk was lost on their road. There was no
evidence of a contract to carry to Albany except such as was iniplied
from the fact that the two roads made a continuous line to Albany, and
the defendants took the trunk for carriage to Albany and received the
pay for carrying through. It was held that the payment and receipt of
fare through bound the defendants as carriers over the other road through
the whole continuous route.
Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610, is an authority to the same point,
that receiving pay for transportation to a place beyond the line of the
carrier who receives it, implies a contract to carry to that place. The
court say.: "Besides, there is a fixed sunm which covers the whole
charge; and it would be absurd to suppose that the defendant was to
receive the whole sum for merely forwarding, that is, placing the goods
on the vessels of some other party to be carried to their place of destination."
Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill 157, cited for the defendants,
recognises the doctrine of Weed v. The Railroad. In his opinion for
reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Chancellor says:
"In the case of Weed v. The Railroad the two lines were connected
together by an arrangement between themselves, and the agent of the
defendant took the pay in advance for the conveyance of the plaintiff
and his baggage the whole distance. Or, if no actual connection between
the two lines was proved, it at least appeared that the defendant permitted its agent to hold it out as a carrier of passengers and their baggage for the whole distance by taking pay therefor." It thus appears
that in Van Santvoord v. St. John, as in Hyde v. The .Navigation
Company, taking pay for carriage to a place beyond the line of the
party that takes it, is regarded as decisive of an undertaking to carry
to that place. Qaimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 Ne w York 315, is to the same
point, that receiving pay for carriage through a continuous line imports
a contract to carry through; and in Burtis v. The Buffalo and State
Line Railroad, 24 New York 269, 278, SUTHERLAND, J., says: " It
would appear to be settled by both the American and English cases
that when from usage in the particular business, or by receiving pay to
theplace to which the goods are addressed, beyond the railway company's road, or from any other circudistance, it is to be presumed that
the undertaking of the railway was to deliver at such place, they are
responsible for the delivery of the goods at such place, and are liable if
the goods are lost after leaving their road."
In 'hoteaux v. Leach, 18 Penn. St. Rep. 224, furs were shipped at
Cincinnati for New York. The defendants admitted that they were
carriers on the canals and railroads of Pennsylvania, but denied that
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they were on the river Ohio. The furs were lost in a steamboat on that
river. The court (BLACK, C. J.) say: "They, the defendants, received
the full freight from Cincinnati to New York; and this is wholly inconsistent with the notion that they were agents for the shipment of the
furs, and not carriers from Cincinnati to Pittsburgh, as well as on other
parts of the route." To the same point is The Baltimore & Philade phia
Steamboat Company v. Brown, 54 Penn. 77, which cites and approves
The Illinois Central Railroad v. Copeland, 24 Illinois 338 ; The Illinois CentralRailroadv. Johnson, 34 Illinois 382, and The Railroadv.
Schwartzenburg, 9 Wright 208. So in Candee v. The Pennlvancit
Railroad,21 Wis. 582, where a railroad sells a through passenger ticket
by a specified route to some point out of the state over lines belonging
to other companies, it seems the understanding .4 the first company is
to transport the passenger and his baggage to such place of destination.
Carey v. The Cleveland & Toledo Railroad,29 Barb. 36, is to the same
effect, and also Theillinois CentralRailroad v. Copeland, 24 Illinois
332, in which it was held that a railroad selling tickets through over its
own and other roads is liable for the safety of passengers and their baggage to the point of destination. Wheeler v. The Railroad,31 Cal. 52,
cites and apparently approves the doctrine as laid down on this point in
2 Redfield on Railways 109. In Carterv. Peck, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 203,
the defendants received fare and gave a ticket to a point beyond their
own line; it was held that they were liable for a detention beyond their
own line. HARRIS, J., delivering the opinion of the court, says:
"When the defendants received the plaintiff's money and gave him a
through ticket, they thereby became bound for his transportation over
the entire line. The arrangement between the defendants and the proprietors of other portions of the line was a matter with which the plaintiff had nothing to do. He was no party to that arrangement, nor was
he bound to look to any person for the performance of the defendant's
undertaking but themselves."
Redfield (Railways 109) sums up the result of the authorities on this
point as follows: "It has generally been considered, both in this country
and in the English courts, that receiving goods destined beyond the terminus of the particular company and giving a check or ticket through
does import an undertaking to carry through, and that this contract is
binding on the company."
Then, again, there are American cases which maintain the doctrine
that, though carriers are associated in a continuous line, and one of
them, on receiving goods marked for transportation through, takes pay
'for transportation through, which- by agreement of the parties to the
continuous line is divided among them in a fixed proportion, yet, in the
absence of a positive agreement, each carrier is liable for loss on his
own line, and not for a loss on any other part of the connected line.
This appears to be the settled rule in Connecticut. In Hood v. The
New York & New Haven Railroad, 22 Conn. 1, the defendants' road
was connected with a line of stage coaches which runs from their terminus to Coleville; and they advertised that passengers by their line
went by stage from Farmington to Coleville. The plaintiff bought a
ticket of the defendants at New Haven for Coleville. The conductor
on the said road took up the plaintiff's ticket and gave him one for the
stage. The plaintiff was injured on the stage route. The whole fare
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through was paid to the defendants, and they accounted on settlement
with the proprietors of the stage line, and this was according to the
custom of the business. There was no other contract between the
stage company and the railroad. It was held that there was no contract by the defendants to carry the plaintiff on the stage route. The
decision would seem to have been put mainly on the ground that the
defendants had no corporate authority to contract for carriage beyond
their own line. In Elmore v. Naugatuck Railroad, 23 Conn. 457, it
was decided that neither the receiving of goods directed to a point beyond the line of the road, nor an advertisement of the general facilities of transportation through the route is evidence of a special
contract to carry goods to the place to which they were directed. The
Naugatuck Railroad v. The Button Company, 24 Conn. 468, is to the
same effect; and in the later case of Converse v. The Norwich and Worcester Transportation Company, 33 Conn. 166, the court consider the
question as settled in Connecticut.
In Maine a single case is cited by the defendants, Perkins v. The
P. S. & P. Railroad,47 Maine 573 (and I have found no other in
that state, bearing on the present question), the head note of which is
as follows: "A railroad company may be bound by special contract
(but not otherwise) to transport persons or property beyond the line
of their own road." It is to be observed that in this case of Perkins v
The Railroad, the plaintiff had judgment, on the ground of a special
contract; from which the negative inference is drawn that the plaintiff
could not -recover otherwise than by a special contract. This cannot be
regarded as quite equivalent to a direct decision on the point; for if the
point was raised in the case it certainly did not require the court to
determine whether a special contract was necessary to charge the
defendants, and besides there is reason to think that the term "express
contract" could hardly have been used in its strict sense to signify a
contract in the form of a direct promise or undertaking in language,
oral or written, proper to show a positive agreement; since the judge,
who delivered the opinion of the court, speaks of a case where the
carriers would be liable on the ground that they "held themselves out
as common carriers to that place ;" in which case, as I understand it,
the contract would not be express, in the strict or usual sense of the
term, but implied from the conduct of the party. And the same learned
judge also says: "It is of great public convenience, if not absolute
necessity, that several companies should combine their operations, and
thus transport passengers and merchandise by a mutual arrangement
over all their lines, upon one contract, for one price. In such cases
each is held liable for the whole distance." Instances are to be met
with in other books of a similar latitude in the use of the term special
contract,as in 2 Redf. on Railways 104, where the term special contract
is used, but the example given is of a contract implied from certain
fnct-s. For these reasons we are not inclined to regard Perkins v. The
Railroad, as a direct and final decision by the courts in Maine of the
question raised in the present case.
In Nuttinq v. The Connecticut River Railroad, I Gray 502, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided that "a railroad corporation
receiving goods for transportation to a place beyond the line of their
road on another railroad which connects with theirs, but with the pro-
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prietors of which they have no connection in business, and taking pay
for transportation over their own road only, are not liable, in the
absence of any special contract, for loss of the goods after their delivery
to the proprietors of the other road." This could hardly be regarded
as an authority for the defendants in the present case; and I find
nothing in the opinion of the court, which carries the doctrine of the
case beyond the statement of the head note. But in later cases the rule
has been established in Massachusetts that a carrier is not bound for
the transportation of goods beyond his own line in the absence of a
positive agreement to that effect. In Darling v. The Boston & Worcester Railroad, 11 Allen 295, it was decided that if an arrangement is
made between several connecting railroad companies, by which goods to
'be carried over the whole route shall be delivered by each to the next
succeeding company, and each company receiving them shall pay to its
predecessor the amount already due for carriage, and the last one
collect the whole from the consignee, a reception of such goods by the
last company, and payment by it of the charges of its predecessors, will
not render it liable for an injury done to the goods before it received
them." From this case the general rule has been deduced in Massachusetts that a carrier is not liable for loss beyond his own line without a
positive agreement to be so liable; though some of the discussion in
Darling v. The Railroadseems hardly consistent with such a rule, for
the learned judge who delivered the opinion says "the usage as to the
manner of doing the business enters into the contract as part of it, in
the absence of an express contract. But the convenience of commerce
makes it highly useful to send goods to distant places which can be
reached only by independent lines of transportation. It is important
that this business should be accommodated ; and this may be done by
express agreement or establishedusage. It is frequently done in this
country by agreements made by the proprietors of connecting lines
with each other; and this is much better than to leave any important
matter of this kind to be settled by usage. When such arrangements
are made the liability of each line is to be determined by a fiir construction of their terms." That is to say, usage enters into the contract
on which the goods are carried for the owner; but when the business
is done on the connected line by an agreement among the parties to it,
the liability of the different parties to the owner for the transportation
of his goods is to be determined by a fair construction of the terms of
the agreement among the parties to the connecting line; and the
contract on which the goods are carried is inferred from usage, or from
the arrangements among the parties to the connected line, and in such
case does not depend on any positive agreement between the owner of
the goods and any one of the carriers.
We have been furnished with a manuscript copy of the opinion in
Goss v. The New York, Providence & Boston Railroad,' in which on
facts that we cannot distinguish from the present, the court held tha
the point was settled by the prior decisions in Massachusetts, especially
by the case of Darling v. Tlhe Railroad, and declined to discuss the
general question further. And in the case of Burroughs v. The Norwich & Worcester Railroad,decided in September, 1868, we have also
I Since reported, 99 Mass. 220.
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been furnished with the opinion of the court holding the law to be well
settled in Massachusetts that a corporation established for the transportation of goods over a line between certain points and receiving goods
directed to a more distant point is not responsible beyond the end of its
zwn line, unless it makes a positive agreement extending its liability.
And this rule, if a newspaper report can be trusted, was lately applied
in Pendergast v. The Adams Express Company, by the same court to
the case of an express company that gives a receipt for money directed
to a place beyond the line of the company that gives the receipt.
It has been said that the English rule on this subject has not been
generally adopted in this country. A review, however, of the American
cases shows but too plainly, that if our courts have differed from the
English, they are far from agreeing among themselves in any principle
or doctrine that can be called the American rule. There is not only
much confusion, but no little conflict in the American authorities. A
large proportion of them are not directly in point for the present case,
which must be decided on the facts found by agreement of the parties.
The following are the facts and circumstances from which the contract
between these parties must be inferred:
The three corporations were engaged as common carriers in the transportation of goods in a connected line between Nashua and New York,
under an agreement among the parties to the connected line.
In the present instance, and generally under the agreement, one price
was paid for transportation through.
The freight-money was divided among the parties to the connected
line in proportions fixed by their agreement.
The goods were received by the defendants for transportation on the
connected line marked for New York.
The legal inference from the general statement of the agreement is
that the parties to the continuous line were bound by their mutual contract to take from each other and carry through goods so marked, that
might be received by any one of them.
The price for transportation to New York was paid to the defendants,
when they received the goods.
The American authorities are comparatively few, which hold that
when all these circumstances concur, the carrier who receives the goods
is not bound, by an implied agreement, to carry them, or see that they
are carried, over the connected line to their final destination. I do not
find that the decisions in any of the states sustain this defence, except
in Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts.
With regard to the cases in Connecticut, it cannot imply any want of
the respect due to the courts of that state, if I say that for two reasons
their cases on this point are not entitled to all the deference that is
paid to their decisions on other subjects. In the first place, it is held
there that railroad corporations have no corporate authority to contract
for the transportation of goods or passengers beyond their own lines; a
doctrine rejected everywhere else. If it were admitted that railroads
had the power to make such contracts, it does not appear that the courts
in Connecticut would have decided that the plaintiff in a case like this
would not be entitled to recover. Indeed it would seem from the
opinion of the court as delivered by Ellsworth, J., in Elmore v. The
Nangtick R~rilroad,23 Conn. 457, that in Connecticut these defend-
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ants would be held liable if their power to contract were conceded. He
says "no money was paid, or agreed to be paid, for conveying the
leather to any specific place. There was no evidence or claim that there
was any connection between the defendants and the steamer, except in
the customary way of forwarding freight they delivered the goods to
each other from time to time as they were marked for transportation,
no matter to what place, whether to New jYork, California, Europe, or
Asia. It is obviousethat where the different carriers throughout the
route are connected in business by some joint undertaking or partnership, there can be no difficulty in case of a loss which happens on any
part of the line; but the question arises, where this is not the case,
what is the law then ?" From this it seems to me that we are warranted in supposing, if the defendants had power to contract and the
facts had been such as are found in the present case, the court in Connecticut would have.no difficulty in charging the defendants for a loss
happening in any part of the line. Then again these decisions in Connecticut were by three judges against two; WAITE, then Chief Justice,
and HINMAN, who has since filled that place. The reasons for holding
the defendants liable in Elmore v. !The Railroad are very ably and
forcibly stated by WAITE, 0. J., in his dissenting opinion. Such dissent,
it is evident, leaves the authority of the cases so much reduced that they
cannot be entitled to great weight out of the jurisdiction in which they
were decided.
The single case of Perk-ins v. The P. S. & P. Railroad,for reasons
before suggested, we cannot consider as a final settlement of the question
in Maine.
But in Massachusetts the court in a series of decisions have established the rule that a carrier, though associated with others in a connected line of transportation, is not liable for a loss happening beyond
his own line without a positive agreement to that effect; and this rule
is applied to the baggage of passengers, and the undertaking of express
companies that receive goods for transportation beyond their own lines.
The fact that notwithstanding the earlier decisions, suits have continued
to be brought in that Commonwealth against parties that have received
goods to be transported on continuous lines for losses happening beyond
their own lines, might seem to suggest a suspicion that the profession
and the public had not readily acquiesced in the rule as there laid down;
but the court have adhered firmly to the rule, and in some of the later
cases have apparently declined to enter on the discussion of the question,
treating it as finally settled; and we must therefore consider the high
authority of that court as against the right of the plaintiffs to recover
in this action. So far, however, as that court may be understood to have
established the rule that to bind a railroad for transportation beyond its
own line there must be an express and positive agreement between the
railroad and the owner of the goods, and that such an undertaking is
not to be implied from facts such as are found in this case, the carrent of American authority, to say nothing of the English, appears to
be strong the other way. Excepting the cases in Connecticut and Maine,
which, when examined, do not, I think, give the Massachusetts doctrine
any very strong support, the authorities in other states, though they
differ much in other particulars, generally agree in this, that where, as
in the present case, there is a continuous line of different carriers united
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by an agreement under which they carry goods through the connected
line for one price, which they divide among themselves in proportions
fixed in their agreement, if one of the parties receiving goods to be
transported on the continuous line, marked for any place in it, and on
receiving the goods takes pay for transporting them to that place, the
party so receiving the goods and the pay for transportation, is vri'md
.facie bound by an implied agreement to carry the goods, or see that
they are carried to the place for which they are marked, and is liable
for a loss happening on any part of the connected line.
If the cause were to be considered on authority only, we should feel
bound to decide for the plaintiffs, inasmuch as we find the weight of
authority to preponderate heavily in their favor; and taking general
principles and reagons of convenience and public policy for our guide,
we are led to the same conclusion.
In the view which the plaintiffs ask us to take of this case, when the
goods were received by the defendants, marked for transportation to
New York, and the price paid to the defendants for transportation
through on the continuous line, the plaintiffs inade one contract with the
defendants, by which the defendants agreed, either as joint carriers
with the other associated parties, or as undertaking for them to carry
the goods through for the price paid, as goods were carried in the usual
course of the business on that line. In that view the plaintiffs would
have nothing further to do in the matter. Everything else was provided for by the agreement among the associated carriers; for by their
agreement the defendants were bound to transport and the successive
carriers would be bound to take and carry the goods from each other to
their final destination. The price through was Xaid, and belonged to
the different carriers in proportions fixed by their agreement; and this
theory would agree exactly with the facts; for the plaintiffs in fact
made but one agreement with one party to have the goods carried for
one price to New York. No further stipulation or direction on the part
of the plaintiffs was necessary, and none was ever in fact given by
owners of goods who put them in the course of transportation, as these
were put, in the continuous line.
According to the defendants' theory of the case, when the plaintiffs
delivered the goods marked for New York, and the defendants received
them and took pay for transportation through, no contract was made
with any party to carry the goods through; but the contract then made
by the defendants was to carry the goods to the next carriers on the
connected line with the surplus- money, and as agents of the plaintiffs
make a contract if they could with the next carriers to take the goods
and the money and carry them on in the same way through successive
agencies for the plaintiff to their final destination.
If these agents
should consent to act for the plaintiffs, and be able to negotiate bargains
with the other carriers for transportation through, the goods would go
to New York as was intended; but they would go under three separate
contracts made at different times through this imaginary agency with
three different and independent parties.
The first objection to the defendants' theory of this transaction is that
it is contrary to the fact. The owner of goods in a case like this does
not in fact appoint or employ the successive carriers in the continuous
line as his agents to hold his money for him, and as his agents carry it
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forward and contract in his -behalf with the other roads for further
transportations He makes but one contract for one price ; he pays the
price, and the money he has paid does not belong to him, but to the
associated carriers in proportions fixed by their agreement. He does
not inquire, nor is he interested to know, how they divide the money.
The contract is entire and complete when he pays the price for transportation through, and everything to be done afterwards is regulated
by the standing agreement among the associated carriers. He has no
control over them as'his agents; he does not and cannot intermeddle
with the manner in which they do the business or dispose of the money
that he has paid for the carriage of his goods.
Let us see what are some of the consequences that would follow, if
.both parties in a case like this should act on the defendants' view of
their legal rights. Suppose in this case the goods had been carried
throug4 to New York, and the defendants had not paid to the next carriers the proportion of the freight-money which belonged to the other
carriers; and then suppose that the Norwich & Worcester Railroad
should sue the plaintiffs for carrying the goods over their road. It
would avail the plaintiffs nothing to say that they had paid the freight
through when the goods were received at this end of the route. The
ready answer would be: " To be sure, you put money into the hands
of your agents, the Worcester & Nashua Railroad, to pay us, but they
neglected their duty; your money is still in their hands, and we are not
paid." It is, however, quite clear, that the money received by the
defendants for transportation through on the connected line would be
held by them for all the parties to the line; they would be bound to
account for it under tieir agreement as one partner accounts with his
fellows for money received on partnership account. Then if the plaintiffs should undertake to pay the different carriers, how are they to know
the share of each? The proportions of the freight-money belonging
to them respectively are regulated by a private agreement of which the
plaintiffs know nothing, and of which in the way the business is actually conducted they have no need to be informed. If the plaintiffs had
proposed when they delivered the goods to pay the Worcester & Nashua
road their proportion of the freight-money and afterwards to pay the
other carriers their respective shares, they probably would have found
nobody to tell them what the different shares were, or to receive the
goods to be carried on such terms. In truth the connected line transacts
business as one joint concern, and the business cannot be transacted otherwise with convenience either to the carriers or the owners of the goods.
Then if we look to the remedy of the associated carriers for the recovery of the freight-money, each, on the theory of the defendants,
must bring a separate suit on the separate contract for his proportion
of the money. We have had occasion to learn from the facts stated in
another case now pending before us that there is a connected line consisting of six or seven different railways extending from Ogdensburg in
New York through Vermont and New Hampshire to Boston in Massachusetts, in which one price is paid for transportation through and the
money divided by a standing agreement as in this case. If goods are
carried through on this route, and there are six or seven different contracts, one with each road, then each road must bring a separate action
for its share of the freight-money. If it should be said that the remedy
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of the roads is to retain the goods at the end of the route till the
whole price for transportation through is paid, this, in the first place,
would show that these roads are so combined that for their own purposes they are a unit, while they insist that they are wholly separate
and independent when the owner seeks redress for the loss of his
goods. And then again, if the roads act separately and are not jointly
interested in the business of the connected line, when one of the roads
parts with the possession of goods by delivery to another, it loses its lien
for the freight-money, and cannot transfer it to another independent
carrier: Angell on Carriers 357, 359, 609. This is not at all like the
maritime lien, when a voyage is broken up and the cargo is put on
board another vessel to be carried to the port of destination. There
the lien on the cargo for the whole freight is transferred to the second
vessel, which completes the transportation under one contract.
The use of steam in carrying goods and passengers has proauced a
great revolution in the whole business. The amount and importance of
it have of late vastly increased and are every day increasing. The
large business between different parts of the country is done, as in this
case, by parties who are associated in long continuous lines, receiving
one fare through and dividing it among themselves by mutual agreemont. They act together for all practical purposes so far as their own
interests are concerned as one united and joint association. In managing and controlling the business on their lines they have all the advantages that could be derived from a legal partnership. They make such
an arrangement among themselves as they see fit for sharing the losses,
as they do the profits that happen in any part of their route. If by
their agreement each party to the connected line is to make good the
losses that happen in his part of the route, the associated carriers, and
not the owner of the goods, have the means of ascertaining where the
losses have happened. And if this cannot be known, there is nothing
unreasonable or inconvenient in their sharing the loss, as in case of a
legal partnership, in proportion to their respective interests in the whole
route.
They undertake the business of common carriers, and must be understood to assume the legal liabilities of that'business. They transact the
business under a change of circumstances; but the principles and the
general policy of the common law, which, as an elementary maxim, holds
the common carrier liable for all accidental losses, must be applied to
these new methods of transacting the same business; and there is certainly nothing in the present condition of the business, which calls for
any relaxation of the old rule. The great value of commodities transported over these connected lines; the increased risk of loss and damage from the immense distances over which they carry goods; the fact
that where goods are once intrusted to carriers on these long routes they
are placed beyond all control and supervision of the owner; are cogent
reasons for holding those who associate in these connected lines, to a
rule that shall give effectual and convenient remedy to the owner, whose
goods have been lost or damaged in any part of the line. Any rule,
which should have the effect to defeat or embarrass the owner's remedy,
would be in direct conflict with the principles and whole policy of the
common law.
What then is the situation of the owner, whose goods have been
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damaged or lost on a continuous line of three or any larger number of
associated carriers, if he can look only to the carrier, on whose part of
the route the damage may have happened ? In the first place he must
.set about learning where his loss happened. This would often be difficult and sometimes quite impossible. Suppose an invoice of flour shipped
in good order at Ogdensburg were found on arrival at Boston to have
been damaged somewhere on the route; or suppose a trunk checked at
Boston for Chicago was broken open and plundered before it reached
Chicago, what would the owner's chance be worth of finding out in
what particular part of the route the damage happened? He would
have no means of learning himself; and he would not, unless of a very
confiding disposition, rely on any very zealous aid in his search from the
different carriers associated in the connected line. And if he should
have the luck to make the discovery, he might be obliged to assert his
claim for compensation against a distant party, among strangers, in circumstances such as would discourage a prudent man, and induce him to
sit down patiently under his loss rather than incur the expense and
risk of pursuing his legal remedy under the rule set up by these defendants. The forlorn condition of the owner in such a case is put in a
strong light by WAITE, C.J., in his dissenting opinion, Elmore v. The
Naugatuck Raitroad, 23 Conn. 478, where he says: " A merchant
residing in Cleveland, Toledo, or Chicago, purchases goods in the city of
New York, which he wishes to send to his place of business. He
enters into a contract with a railroad company for their transportation
e whole distance. Hi
e b
not to any given point on the
delivers the good to the company and they are taken and locked up in
freight cars. Re does not accompany them, and often sees and hears
of
theirrun
placeover
to him
they are
of them
nothing more The
arc atoften
are placed
theydelivered
in which
cars until
destination.
roads belonging to different companies to save trouble and expense of
If the goods are lost or damaged on the route he ordiof cars.
change'has
no means of determining where or in whose custody the
narily
The trouble and expense of ascertaining that fact in
injury occurred.
many cases would amount to more than the whole damage. As a prudcnt, cautious man he would be unwilling to intrust his goods to the
custody of others, unless he could find some person or company that
would be responsible for their safe delivery." The remarks of SMITH,
J., 34 New York 501, before cited, are of the same import, showing the
difficulties and embarrassments of the owner, if he can only resort for
compensation to the carrier in the connected line, on whose part of the
route the damage happened.
A rule, which throws such difficulties in the way of the owner who
seeks to recover of common carriers for the loss of his goods, I cannot
but regard as a wide departure from the general doctrine of the common
law on this subject; and nothing is plainer than the duty of courts to
apply the general principles of the common law to the new circumstances which are introduced by changes in the manner of transacting
any business.
Few things are of greater importance to the whole country than the
cheap, convenient, and safe transportation of goods between distant
points. Vast sums of money are expended to promote this object. The
business is already immense and constantly increasing. Most of this
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business is done on connecting lines of railroads and steamboats, and
these by continuous lines have a practical monopoly of the business on
their respective routes. The owner of goods must intrust them to these
associated carriers; they cannot be carried in any other way. Not only
those who are engaged directly in carrying and sending goods are interested in this subject; all who produce and all who consume are interested that goods should be carried as cheaply, as conveniently, and as
safely as possible. Public policy and the public interest concur with the
general maxim of. the law that those who transact this great business,
should be held to a rule which shall give a ready and effectual remedy
to the owner whose goods have been lost or damaged in any part of these
connected lines of transportation.
There is a perplexing diversity of decision on this subject, in the different tribunals of this country. For instance, by the law of New
York, as we understand it to be established by the construction which
the courts have given to their statute, if goods are received in that state
for transportation through on a connected line of railroads, the road that
receives the goods is liable for loss or damage happening in any part of
the connected line, though beyond the limits of the state: Burtis v.
The Buffalo & State Line Railroad,24 N. Y. 269.

As has been before

mentioned, there is a connected line of six or seven railroads extending
from Ogdensburg to Boston. If goods are received by the Ogdensburg Railroad for transportation to Boston, and are lost or damaged
on any part of the line, say on the Lowell Railroad, the Ogdensburg
Railroad is liable for the loss. But if merchandise is received at
Boston by the Lowell Railroad for transportation to.Qgdensburg over
the same connected line of railroads associated under the same agreement, the owner would be left to find out, if he could, on which of the
six or seven connected roads his goods were lost or damaged, and could
claim for his loss of that road alone. There would seem to be no remedy
for this confusion and conflict of decisions unless the national legislature
can provide one under the power given by the constitution to regulate
commerce.
I come to the conclusion that on the case stated the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover; and such is the unanimous opinion of the court.
The foregoing case is one of importance and interest, both to the profession
and to business men, at this particular
juncture, when the necessities of transportation are driving railway companies
into the creation of extended lines of
passenger and goods traffic, and when
there continue to be such irreconcilable
differences in the decisions of the different states in regard to the rights and
responsibilities of the respective parties.
The whole subject is so fully presented
in the opinion, and the cases so extensively commented upon, that we should

not feel justified in going over the same
ground.
It has seemed to us that much of the
apparent conflict in the decisions upon
this subject might be measurably reconciled by defining, more carefully and
exactly, the precise grounds upon which
a contract for transportation beyond the
line of the first carrier will be implied.
It would scarcely do to refer the matter
to the determination of the jury, in each
particular case. That would be likely
to produce too much uncertainty for
practical convenience. The great argu-
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ment in favor of the English rule, as
declared in Muschamp v. Lancaster and
Preston Railway, 8 Mf. & W. 421, and
other subsequent English cases is, that
it establishes a fixed and definite rule,
and one that meets, fairly enough, the
practical convenience of the public.
But that is not all that is to be
sought after. We must, and should
have some reference to the public duties
of common carriers and what those who
employ them may fairly demand of them.
It is very obvious that carriers, for their
own protection, and to extend their business, would naturally desire to conduct
it upon such principles, as to afford reasonable and just accommodation to their
employers. And it seems but reasonable
and just that all judicial constructions
should be made in the same direction and
with the same end in view. And we by
no means intend to intimate that this has
not always been the case in the decisions
bearing upon this subject, and as affecting the numerous incidental questions
involved. But it has seemed as if that
consideration might safely have been
permitted, in some cases, to have had a
more controlling influence than was
allowed. We comprehend, well enough,
that a fixed rule made by declaring a
bard and fast line and steadfastly adhering to it, with no reserve or qualification,
is sometimes supposed to save courts a
vast deal of perplexity, which a sliding
scale or rule, more or less resting in
discretion, would be almost sure to produce and to multiply almost indefinitely.
And still too great, or too strict, adherence to abstract rules is sure to produce
injustice in extreme casqs. It seems to
us, if we must have a fixed rule, that
the English rule upon this subject is
more just and more prjtlicable, than
iny inflexible application of the rule of
limiting responsibility to the line of the
first company can be made; and especially where there is an acknowledged

business connection between the different
companies.
It is not always easy to define precisely what connection between different
companies, in the transportation of
goods, shall bind the first company
throughout the line. But in a case like
the principal one, where the goods are
billed through, and the entire freight
paid, there should, it would seem, be no
question that such facts should be regarded as evidence of an express contract to carry through. There can be no
doubt the parties to such a transaction
ordinarily so regard.it. It is a forced
and unnatural construction to regard it
in any other light. The consignor in
no sense regards the agent of the first
company as contracting in the capacity
of agent for the successive companies,
but as the agent for the first company,
whose agent he is, and whose agent
only. The case of Schneider v. Evans,
9 Am. Law Beg. N. S. 536, is of this
character, and the erroneous conclusion
of the court in that case was brought
about by attempting to give the transaction the forced and unnatural construction of allowing the successive companies to demand more than their proportion of the entire sum stipulated by
the first company for the entire freight.
How much less than this shall be held
as amounting to an express contract to
carry through, it will not, at once, be
easy to determine. But the exigencies
of business and the experience of the
courts will, from time to time, enable us
to fix and define the proper limitations.
The case of Darling v. Boston and Worcester Railroad, II Allen 295, fell very
much short of this, and the court held
the facts in that case not inconsistent
with separate responsibility.
In Boroughs v. Norwich and 9Worcester
Railroad, 100 Mass. 26, there was nothing more than in the next preceding
case, upon which to found an implication
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of an undertaking for the entire route,
except the tariff of freight posted in the
office of the first company, which gave
the through rate in one item, without
distinguishing the particular rate of the
separate companies. This alone would
not be very conclusive of an undertaking
to carry through. But the difficulty
was, in this particular case, if so applied, that the bill contained an exception of the very risk upon which the
loss occurred, and would, therefore, be
fatal to the plaintiffs case, if made to
form the basis of responsibility. But
the case of Gass v. New York, P., and
B. Railroad, 99 Mass. 220, did contain
the feature of charging through freight,
and the court held it not sufficient upon
which to imply an undertaking for the
entire route on the part of the first company. But we think the principal case
must be regarded as having established,
upon most unquestionable grounds, the
rule that the first company of a continuous line of transportation receiving
goods and accepting the freight through
and giving a bill through, must be
understood as undertaking for the entire
route, unless there is something in the
bill of lading, or receipt, or other documents referred to as part of the contract,
to indicate a different understanding, or
unless the usages of the business or the
custom of the line known or accessible
to the knowledge of the shipper, show
that such was not the expectation of the
parties. Starting from this safe point,
and assuming that in the absence of all
business connection between the different
lines, the responsibility is several as to
each company for its own defaults only,
we trust the courts will hold such a judicious control over the construction of
different classes of contracts upon this
subject as to reach the actual or probable justice of each particular class. But
it will not be easy to define, in advance,
precisely how much weight shall be given
to each particular feature in a transac-

tion, or what particular facts or circumstances shall be held decisive in regard
to the first company being, or not being,
holden throughout the line.
The tendency in this country is unquestionably in the direction of extended
lines of transportation, either by actual
consolidation of stock, by leases, or by
some business arrangement, more or less
stringent. And with this tendency we
must expect a corresponding tendency
towards holding the first company bound
for the entire transportation. And it
would seem not unreasonable where there
is a fixed business connection throughout the line, that the first company
should be holden to the extent of such
business connection. It is certainly much
easier for the first company to obtain
indemnity from its associates than for
the shipper to seek it of strangers, which
all the subsequent companies must be
regarded as to him. And it would seem
far more just to hold the first company
responsible for the defaults of its associates than to hold that the shipper must
find evidence to make his case against
them, when it is so easy for them to
cover it up by means of the facilities
growing out of the very association.
If we ever reach the point towards
which we have been drifting from the
first establishment of railways in the
country, of regarding them as a part of
the commerce between the different
states, and as much subject to the national control as the commerce which is
carried on by means of navigation upon
the ocean, through the numerous bays
and inlets along the coast, we may expect something more definite, either by
way of legislation or judicial construction upon the important questions here
involved. How long we shall be doomed
to endure the embarrassments resulting
from local legislation and conflicting
judicial constructions upon this and
numerous other embarrassing questions
connected with railway traffic it is im-

